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CANAAN

IN BAD FAITH: ANTI-SHARIA LAWS, THE CONSTITUTION,
AND THE LIMITS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
ISABELLE CANAAN*
INTRODUCTION
In March 2011, during his failed presidential campaign, Newt
Gingrich said, referencing the world his granddaughters would inherit:
I am convinced that if we do not decisively win the
struggle over the nature of America, by the time they’re
my age they will be in a secular atheist country,
potentially one dominated by radical Islamists and with
no understanding of what it once meant to be an
American.1
For Gingrich, the fear of an increasingly secular society
encompasses Muslim domination. His quote combines themes that
continue to reverberate in politics and law: religion, secularism, Islam,
and ‘real’ America. This Article analyzes the genesis, text, and
implementation of anti-sharia laws to tackle how these forces struggle
within themselves, and against each other.
Prejudicial language, exemplified by Gingrich’s words, has realworld consequences. In 2012, a year after Gingrich’s remarks, a woman
in New York City pushed a man she believed to be Muslim into the path
of an oncoming subway train.2 In 2016, assaults against Muslims
© 2021 Isabelle Canaan
*Isabelle Canaan has a J.D. from Columbia Law School. Thank you to Kellen Funk for
providing guidance and thought partnership when this Article was still in Note form, for
challenging me to think beyond strict, traditional legal scholarship, and for constantly
championing me and this piece. For generous assistance and interdisciplinary feedback, thank
you to the participants in both the Berkeley Right-Wing Studies Working Group and the
Columbia Law School Human Rights Paper Symposium. A special thank you to the staff of
the University of Maryland Law Journal of Race, Religion, Gender & Class for their
dedication and thoughtful editorial assistance.
1 Kendra Marr, Newt Talks Faith at Texas Church, POLITICO (March 27, 2011),
https://www.politico.com/story/2011/03/newt-talks-faith-at-texas-church052023#ixzz1I1Exj7oT.
2 Marc Santora, Woman is Charged with Murder as a Hate Crime in a Fatal Subway Push,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/30/nyregion/woman-is-heldin-death-of-man-pushed-onto-subway-tracks-in-queens.html. When asked why she committed
this act, the woman said, “I pushed a Muslim off the train tracks because I hate Hindus and
Muslims ever since 2001 when they put down the twin towers I’ve been beating them up.” Id.
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surpassed the previous spike in 2001 after the September 11th attacks.3
This trend builds on the 2015 Chapel Hill shooting of Razan and Yusor
Mohammad Abu-Salha, murdered by a neighbor who disapproved of
their faith.4 Beyond physical violence, the mainstreaming of dangerous
stereotypes about Muslims undergirded President Trump’s Executive
Order 13769, more commonly known as the Muslim Ban.5 The text of
the Executive Order states, “[t]he United States must ensure that those
admitted to this country do not bear hostile attitudes towards it and its
founding principles. The United States cannot, and should not, admit
those who do not support the Constitution, or those who would place
violent ideologies over American law.”6
Any long-term attempt to address the increase of Islamophobia,
and particularly its manifestation in anti-sharia laws, must begin with an
examination of the foundational biases that give rise to hateful and
prejudicial acts. With this larger goal in mind, this Article investigates
the nexus of religious liberty, Islam, and Americanism to further explore
how stereotypes about Muslim Americans and Islam are conceived and
maintained by flawed conceptions of religion and perverted tactics of
constitutional interpretation.
Although religious liberty is enshrined in the First Amendment
of the Constitution, the precise definition of what counts as religion
remains unsettled.7 In the absence of clear definitions, interpretive
methods do the work of delineating the borders between religion and
3 Katayoun Kishi, Assaults Against Muslims in U.S. Surpass 2001 Level, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Nov.
15, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/11/15/assaults-against-muslims-in-u-ssurpass-2001-level/.
4 Jonathan M. Katz, In Chapel Hill, Suspect’s Rage Went Beyond a Parking Dispute, N.Y.
TIMES (March 3, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/04/us/chapel-hill-muslim-studentshootings-north-carolina.html.
5 Vahid Niayesh, Trump’s Travel Ban Really Was a Muslim Ban, Data Suggests, WASH. POST
(Sept. 26, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/09/26/trumps-muslim-banreally-was-muslim-ban-thats-what-data-suggest/. See also Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S.Ct. 2392,
2423 (2018) (affirming the ban and stating that “under these circumstances, the Government has
set forth a sufficient national security justification to survive rational basis review. We express
no view on the soundness of the policy. We simply hold today that plaintiffs have not
demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of their constitutional claim.”).
6 Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017).
7 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”). Indeed, courts have never defined religion since
“[m]en may believe what they cannot prove. They may not be put to the proof of their religious
doctrines or beliefs. Religious experiences which are as real as life to some may be
incomprehensible to others.” United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944). Instead, when
faced with Religious Clause claims, courts focus on the sincerity, rather than the substance, of
the religious belief. For example, in conscientious objector cases, the court has held that its task
“is to decide whether the beliefs professed by a registrant are sincerely held and whether they
are, in his own scheme of things, religious.” United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965).
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secularism. Popular constitutionalism, which understands the
Constitution as a living document ripe for interpretation by new and
diverse communities, is one such interpretive method.8 Although
assumed to be progressive, dynamic, and inclusive, popular
constitutionalism has so far failed to define secularism and religion in
ways that protect all religious communities. In fact, popular
constitutionalism has been most successfully wielded as a tool by social
movements advocating for anti-sharia laws that purposely strip Islam of
its religious components.
Part I examines popular constitutionalism, the role of social
movements, and the undefined terrain of religion and secularism. After
an analysis of traditional popular constitutionalism, this Part includes
ancedotes of the Tea Party and the Second Amendment movement as
examples of conservative social movements that have used popular
constitutionalism towards non-progressive ends. Then, it introduces
secularism and religion as contested spaces into which popular
constitutionalist actors have an opportunity to offer clarity. Part I will
end with a brief discussion of the history of anti-Muslim sentiment in
America.9 This history impacts both the public receptiveness to antisharia laws and grounds contemporary anti-Muslim biases.
Similar to the Christian Ten Commandments or Jewish
Talmudic Law, sharia is a religious code with which Muslims try to live
in congruence.10 Yet, anti-Muslim promoters use popular
constitutionalism to pass anti-sharia laws and thus institutionalize their
belief that Islam is not protected religion. Part II analyzes the different
types of proposed anti-sharia laws, and then examines how anti-Muslim
social movements entrench their belief that Islam is an anti-American
political doctrine lacking religious components.11

8 Ari Shapiro, Conservatives Have ‘Originalism’; Liberals Have…?, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (June
23, 2009, 10:00 AM ET), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=105439966.
9 See infra Part I.
10 Sharia is a branch of Islamic law. It is not practiced uniformly throughout the Muslim world
as there are many different schools of interpretation, including Hanafi, Malifi, Shafi’i, Hanbali,
and Ithna Ashari. Carlo A. Pedrioli, Constructing the Other: U.S. Muslims, Anti-Sharia Law,
and the Constitutional Consequences of Volatile Intercultural Rhetoric, 22 S. CAL. INTERDISC.
L.J. 65, 66 (2012). Sharia is primarily concerned with the observance of the five pillars of Islam
(belief in God, prayer, fasting, hajj, and charity), derived from the Quran and the hadiths. Ross
Johnson, A Monolithic Threat: The Anti-Sharia Movement and America’s Counter-Subversive
Tradition, 19 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 183, 187 (2012). Sharia may be best be
understood as guidance on how to live in correspondence with God and literally means “the
clear, well-trodden path to water.” Bridge Initiative Team, Factsheet: Sharia, GEORGETOWN
BRIDGE INITIATIVE (Dec. 5, 2018), https://bridge.georgetown.edu/research/factsheet-sharia/.
11 See infra Part II.
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To challenge both anti-sharia laws and the prejudices on which
they rely, Part III recommends that Muslim rights and antidiscrimination activists use the Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection Clause.12 In particular, this Part examines how civil rights
activists could mirror the work of gender and sex equality activists, who
successfully argued that laws discriminating on the basis of gender
unconstitutionally entrenched harmful and outdated stereotypes.
I.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Sections I.A and I.B briefly discuss traditional conceptions of
popular constitutionalism and the role social movements play in the
meaning-making process.13 Section I.C then explores how the assumed
progressive tactic of popular constitutionalism can actually be used
towards regressive ends, illuminated by the examples of the Tea Party
and the Second Amendment movement.14 Section I.D demonstrates
how, absent coherent definitions, secularism and religion are ripe for
interpretation by both judicial and non-judicial actors.15 This Section
includes a discussion of historic perspectives on Islam in America to
illuminate how the boundaries of what qualifies as protected religion
have long been policed. All throughout, this Section emphasizes that an
understanding of popular constitutionalism, particularly its historical
usage and theoretical background, is necessary to appreciate how the
interpretive mechanism is being used as a strategic framing tool by antiMuslim actors to fill the void left by undefined religion.16
A. Traditional Conceptions of Popular Constitutionalism
“The Supreme Court is not the highest authority in the land on
constitutional law. We are.”17

12

See infra Part III.
See infra Sections I.A & I.B.
14 See infra Section I.C.
15 See infra Section I.D.
16 It is important to remember that tactics like popular constitutionalism are ideologically
neutral. Popular constitutionalism used by counterbalancing social movements could be a
solution to the proliferation of anti-sharia laws, but just the presence of popular
constitutionalism alone does nothing to move the needle in either a progressive or regressive
direction. Social movements, as discussed in this section, are the mediating actors that, in
applying the popular constitutionalist frame to their agenda, imbue it with ideology and power.
17 LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW 248 (2004).
13
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Modern popular constitutionalism demands that the American
people play a crucial role in interpreting the Constitution, including
constitutional rights like religious liberty.18 For many scholars, the
United States Constitution was itself an act of popular constitutionalism
in its prioritization of the will of the people over colonial government
officials.19 Invoking this original revolutionary action, and resonant
with a desire for a powerful and engaged body politic, popular
constitutionalism gives the people the final interpretive authority on
constitutional issues.20
As the political community expands, historically marginalized
communities are welcomed to offer their interpretations of
constitutional provisions which can change public understanding and
influence judges.21 Popular constitutionalists believe that it is
“normatively desirable” for the people, an expanding and diversifying
group, to engage in constitutional interpretation.22 The courts should
consider, and sometimes defer to, the legitimate claims of the people
and their elected representatives on constitutional issues.23
Historically, progressive movements have prized popular
constitutionalism. Prior to the First World War, progressives
endeavored to rethink the Constitution and the law. 24 Along with
ambitions to up-end their contemporary administrative and regulatory
state, these progressives dreamt of solidifying norms of democratic

18

Id. at 524.
Larry D. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism Circa 2004, 92 CAL. L. REV. 959, 962 (2004).
20 Tom Donnelly, Make Popular Constitutionalism Work, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 159, 168 (2012).
Popular constitutionalism brings citizens into the political and constitutional discussion to
promote civic competence, citizen activism, and electoral responsiveness. Id. at 185.
21 The expansion of voting rights during the nineteenth and twentieth century changed the
complexion of the American body politic. The Fifteenth Amendment, ratified in 1870,
enfranchised African American men. However, they were not able to fully fulfill these rights
until the 1964 Twenty-Fourth Amendment eliminated poll taxes. Additionally, the Nineteenth
Amendment, ratified in 1920, enfranchised American women, and the Twenty-Sixth
Amendment, ratified in 1971, lowered the voting age for all elections to eighteen. See U.S.
CONST. amends. XV, XIX, XXIV, & XXVI.
22 Rebecca E. Zietlow, Popular Originalism? The Tea Party Movement and Constitutional
Theory, 64 FLA. L. REV. 483, 498 (2012).
23 Christopher W. Schmidt, Popular Constitutionalism on the Right: Lessons from the Tea
Party, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 523, 523 (2011). Accordingly, advocates for popular
constitutionalism have attacked the Supreme Court’s efforts to anoint itself as the preeminent
and exclusive constitutional interpreter.
24 William E. Forbath, Popular Constitutionalism in the Twentieth Century: Reflections on the
Dark Side, the Progressive Constitutional Imagination, and the Enduring Role of Judicial
Finality in Popular Understandings of Popular Self-Rule, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 967, 975-76
(2006). See Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism Circa 2004, supra note 19.
19
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accountability and constitutional interpretation.25 Against a
conservative Lochner-era Supreme Court, progressives used popular
constitutionalism to advocate for an expanded and improved vision of
government power that protected the civil rights of the working class
and the poor.26 Invoking the Constitution’s preamble to justify their
arguments for dynamic and inclusive judicial interpretation, they argued
that the establishment of a more perfect union was an iterative process.27
Progressives used popular constitutionalism to reimagine the document
as an oppositional force to the nine unelected Supreme Court justices.28
Finally, scholars who advocate for popular constitutionalism tend to be
liberal, thereby strengthening the assumption that the interpretive
method is inherently progressive.29
Yet, assuming that popular constitutionalism has a progressive
ideological affiliation ignores the significant history of conservative
popular constitutionalism.30 Scholars, like Rebecca Zietlow,
Christopher Schmidt, and William Forbath argue that popular
constitutionalism is a process, absent ideological commitments.31 In
fact, invocations of popular constitutionalism require only a
constitutional claim and the belief that the people, however delineated,
deserve a seat at the table.32 Social movements are often the vehicles
through which these seats are claimed.
B. The Role of Social Movements
“To borrow a phrase from T.S. Eliot, social movements are
important because they dare to disturb the universe.”33
25 Forbath, supra note 24, at 976. As Forbath puts it, these progressives desired “to create a
modern democracy that was more, not less, rooted in popular participation and decision-making,
more, not less, open to initiative and change from below, one that was deliberative in a more
popular and plebian fashion than liberal constitutionalists today generally think possible.” Id.
26 See Jack M. Balkin, “Wrong the Day it was Decided”: Lochner and Constitutional
Historicism, 85 B.U. L. REV. 677, 720 (2005).
27 Schmidt, supra note 23, at 552; U.S. CONST. pmbl. (“We the People of the United States, in
Order to form a more perfect Union, establish justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for
the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to
ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution.”).
28 Schmidt, supra note 23, at 546.
29 Zietlow, supra note 22, at 496.
30 See id.; Schmidt, supra note 23, at 552; Forbath, supra note 24, at 972.
31 See infra Section I.C.
32 Schmidt, supra note 23, at 523.
33 Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Principles, Practices, and Social Movements, 154 U. PA.
L. REV. 927, 946 (2006). See T.S. Eliot, The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock (1917), reprinted
in THE COMPLETE POEMS AND PLAYS 1909-1950, at 4-5 (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1980) (“Do
I dare / Disturb the universe?”).
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Social movements are the primary organizational tools for
popular constitutionalists.34 In both grassroots and institutionalized
forms, social movements give structure to constitutionalist ambitions
and target them effectively towards political parties, electoral politics,
litigation, advocacy, and even judicial appointments.35 In doing so, they
wrest power away from the Supreme Court and return it to the people.36
Social movements influence constitutional interpretation
through two related but independent verticals: altering public opinion
and impacting party systems.37 When it comes to changing public
opinion, a social movement’s success is constrained by the public’s
receptiveness to the new baseline.38 Social movements are instrumental
in bringing a topic into mainstream dialogue and socializing the public
until the movement’s perspective seems natural and obvious.39 As Jack
34 See id. at 928-29. Social movements differ in their levels of institutionalization and
formalization. In the ideal grassroots social movement, group power is vested in the ability to
turn out vocal, mass populations driven to direct action by a collectively held grievance. J. Craig
Jenkins, Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements, 9 ANN. REV. OF
SOCIO. 527, 539 (1983). Grassroots groups are distrustful of established politics and function as
non-institutional checks on institutional power. PAUL PIERSON & THEDA SKOCPOL, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS: ACTIVIST GOVERNMENT AND THE RISE OF
CONSERVATISM 50 (2007). At the other end of the spectrum, institutionalized social
organizations function like professionalized lobby groups. Unlike grassroots social movements,
in which individual local activists select group strategies like mass demonstrations, professional
groups only call upon members to participate in highly structured and choreographed events. 36
PATRICK G. COY, RESEARCH IN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, CONFLICTS AND CHANGE 5 (2013).
Especially since movement elites make decisions and allocate resources, these movements
usually have weak participatory inclinations. There are various permutations of group
organization between these two ideal-types, and the social movement terrain is constantly
evolving, with established institutions and actors responding to groups who correspondingly
transform. Mario Diani & Paolo Donati, Organisational Change in Western European
Environmental Groups: A Framework for Analysis, 8 ENV’T POL. 13, 17 (1999); Donatella Della
Porta, Research on Social Movements and Political Violence, 31 QUALITATIVE SOCIO. 221, 222
(2008).
35 Lee J. Strang, Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism: Theoretical Possibilities and
Practical Differences, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 253, 258 (2011).
36
Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122
HARV. L. REV. 191, 193 (2008). In her examination of the Heller decision, Reva Siegel looks
first at the social movement conflict that preceded the decision, remarking that: “The effort to
persuade—and to capture institutions that can authoritatively pronounce law—can prompt
mobilization, counter-mobilization, coalition, and compromise, a process that can forge and
discipline new understandings that courts engaged in responsive interpretation recognize as the
Constitution.” Id.
37 Jack M. Balkin, How Social Movements Change (or Fail to Change) the Constitution: The
Case of the New Departure, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 27, 30 (2005).
38 See Reva B. Seigel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional
Change: The Case of the de facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1356 (2006).
39 Balkin, How Social Movements Change, supra note 37, at 52.
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Balkin and Reva Siegel write, to enact change, social movements “take
advantage of broad-based social, economic, or technological changes
that unsettle conventional understandings about the jurisdiction of
constitutional principles in order to make new claims about the proper
application of constitutional principles.”40 In doing so, they often
socialize originally radical opinions. 41
Grassroots groups, which mythicize the superiority of the people
over institutional actors, do the work of altering public opinion.42
Grassroots groups embody the promise of people-driven democracy that
exists beyond and beneath institutions.43 These groups emerge
spontaneously and mobilize the masses in large demonstrations to hold
politicians accountable.44
However, even if a movement successfully changes public
opinion through grassroots mobilization, its impact can arguably only
be fully actualized if it becomes politically powerful, which requires
links to institutional actors within the political system.45 Because of the
access that institutionalized social movements have to political elites,
larger donor bases, and institutional channels, they are better positioned
to impact political parties. In doing so, they reshape the constitutional
common sense by injecting their claims into the legislative and judicial
system.46 For example, though the Women’s Movement successfully
changed public opinion on women’s equality, it did not achieve its
seminal goal of achieving Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) ratification
40

Balkin & Siegel, supra note 33, at 929.
Balkin, “Wrong the Day it was Decided”, supra note 26, at 718.
42 Donnelly, supra note 20, at 166, 189; Larry Alexander & Lawrence B. Solum, Popular?
Constitutionalism?, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1594, 1640 (2005) (book review) (arguing that
“constitutional interpretation by mob . . . is the logical stopping point of” popular
constitutionalism); Kathleen Blee & Ashley Currier, How Local Social Movement Groups
Handle a Presidential Election, 29 QUALITATIVE SOCIO. 261, 270 (2006). Because of the
emphasis on popular interpretation, critics dismiss popular constitutionalism as a form of
tyranny of the majority, emphasizing a fear that even the founders identified. Larry Alexander
& Lawrence B. Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1594, 1639-40.
43 KATHLEEN BLEE, DEMOCRACY IN THE MAKING: HOW ACTIVIST GROUPS FORM 3 (2012)
(stating that “[d]emocracy is a process moved forward by the deliberate work that people do
together”); Siegel, Constitutional Culture, supra note 38, at 1341 (describing democracy as a
form of social organization that “values participant engagement in collective deliberation . . . .
[which] helps establish what things mean[,] . . . why they matter[, and] . . . who we are”).
44 Pierson & Skocpol, supra note 34, at 50.
45 Balkin, How Social Movements Change, supra note 37, at 30. It is important to note that
there has been an increase in radical political movements with oppositional politics that reject
any linkages or alliances with institutional actors. See, e.g., Michael J. Jensen & Henrik P. Bang,
Occupy Wall Street: A New Political Form of Movement and Community?, 10 J. INFO. TECH &
POL. 444, 444 (2013).
46 Balkin, “Wrong the Day It Was Decided,” supra note 26, at 719; Balkin, How Social
Movements Change, supra note 37, at 52.
41
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because of a lack of elite-level buy-in.47 In sum, both grassroots and
institutionalized social movements are integral to the popular
constitutional project because of their ability to socialize the public and
motivate political change.
C. Not-So-Progressive Popular Constitutionalism
“Originalism is not just jurisprudence; it is discourse and
language.” 48
Conservative social
movements
can
use popular
constitutionalism to reframe constitutional tenets in furtherance of their
agenda. Movements of this type often combine popular
constitutionalism with originalism.49 Originalism purports to avoid the
problem of interpretive subjectivity by locating decisive power within
the judiciary.50 Originalists traditionally ignore the evolving
constitutional landscape and claims by non-institutional actors.51
Instead, they draw their legal authority from a narrow focus on the
constitutional text. 52
Conservative social movements often employ originalism as a
useful rhetorical tool to connect contemporary and foundational
constitutional claims, convincing people that they must safeguard “the
47 See SIDNEY TARROW, POWER IN MOVEMENT: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND CONTENTIOUS
POLITICS 227-29 (3d ed. 2011).
48 Siegel, Constitutional Culture, supra note 38, at 1347.
49 Strang, supra note 35, at 254. Lee Strang presents the five axes that determine where and
when popular constitutionalism and originalism converge in a phenomenon he calls “popular
originalism:” (1) whether originalism embraces departmentalism in place of judicial
interpretative supremacy, (2) whether originalism requires judicial deference to popular
interpretive judgments, (3) the extent to which the Constitution’s original meaning permits the
popular branches to engage in authoritative constitutional interpretation, (4) the extent to which
the popular branches authoritatively construct constitutional meaning when the Constitution is
underdetermined, and (5) whether originalism includes a place for non-originalist precedent. Id.
50 Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism Circa 2004, supra note 19, at 962.
51
André LeDuc, Originalism’s Claims and Their Implications, 70 ARK. L. REV. 1007, 1099
(2018) (“Originalism does offer a robust constitutional promise to the conservative
constitutional theorist because it promises a return from modernity . . . . If the originalists can
resort to it as the touchstone of constitutional interpretation, they will construct a simpler, more
conservative constitutional world.”).
52 Jared A. Goldstein, The Tea Party Movement and the Perils of Popular Originalism, 53 ARIZ.
L. REV. 827, 850 (2011); Kellen Funk, Shall These Bones Live? Property, Pluralism, and the
Constitution of Evangelical Reform, 41(3) L. & SOC. INQUIRY 742, 757, 757 n.22 (2016) (“For
instance, McConnell: ‘Taken to its logical conclusion,’ living constitutionalism turns the
Constitution into ‘only a makeweight: what gives force to our conclusions is simply our beliefs
about what is good, just, and efficient . . . it instructs us to disregard the Constitution whenever
we disagree with it.’”).
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constitutional convictions of Americans dead and living.”53
Historically, John Calhoun and the southern segregationists invoked
conservative popular constitutional rationale during the antebellum era,
and contemporarily, the Tea Party and the Second Amendment
movement demonstrate that the two theories can converge.54 Although
these groups employ a popular constitutionalist framing, they
simultaneously reject key tenets of classic popular constitutionalism,
including the desired inclusion of an expanding American political
community.55
i.

The Tea Party

The Tea Party emerged as a referendum on President Obama and
the Democratic Party’s policy of government bailouts and large-scale
market intervention during the 2008 Great Recession.56 In the face of
perceived government over-regulation, the Tea Party argued for small,
state-centered politics, advocating for the repeal of the Seventeenth
Amendment and encouraging states to pass “sovereignty resolutions.”57
The Tea Party used popular constitutionalism to inject its particular,
narrow reading of the Constitution into the mainstream through
educational outreach, state-level constitutional mobilization, and

53 Siegel, Dead or Alive, supra note 36, at 246. According to Jack Balkin, the use of the
Constitution by these types of actors is “of-a-piece living constitutionalism.” These groups
center their claims around the Constitution, but tactically use popular constitutionalist
approaches to articulate those claims. Strang, supra note 35, at 261 (citing Jack M. Balkin,
Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 549, 601 (2009)).
54 Zietlow, supra note 22, at 496-97. Similarly, John Compton, in his book The Evangelical
Origins of the Living Constitution, discusses how the nineteenth century evangelical movement
successfully re-interpreted the Commerce Clause, using popular constitutionalist arguments to
expand the clause to encompass what they wanted. Through this example, he argues that living,
and popular, constitutionalism was not a product of progressive, academic elites, but of populist
evangelicals who took advantage of popular constitutionalism’s invitation for other voices to
weigh in on constitutional meaning. JOHN W. COMPTON, THE EVANGELICAL ORIGINS OF THE
LIVING CONSTITUTION 14, 177-180 (2014). See also Funk, supra note 52, at 756, 761
55
Zietlow, supra note 22, at 507-08.
56 Christine Trost & Lawrence Rosenthal, Introduction to STEEP: THE PRECIPITOUS RISE OF
THE TEA PARTY 8, 10, 18 (Lawrence Rosenthal & Christine Trost eds., 2012). On February
19, 2009, Rick Santelli, a CNBC on-air editor, provided the rallying cry that stimulated largescale Tea Party organizing, ranting, “President Obama, are you listening? . . . It’s time for
another tea party.” Id
57 Schmidt, supra note 23, at 539 (explaining that “sovereignty resolutions” are “statements
asserting a commitment to the principle of state sovereignty as recognized in the Tenth
Amendment”); Ilya Somin, The Tea Party Movement and Popular Constitutionalism, 105 NW.
U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 300, 306 (2011) (discussing how the abolishment of the Seventeenth
Amendment would eliminate “the requirement that senators be popularly elected”). The Tea
Party would like state legislators to select senators. Id. at 307.
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national politics.58 According to the Tea Party’s worldview, citizens
have a responsibility to read the Constitution, determine its meaning,
and demand that public officials act compatibly.59 Initially, Tea Partiers
used local, grassroots activism to pressure GOP officeholders.60 These
mass mobilization efforts catapulted Tea Party issues to national
relevance.61 In the 2010-midterm elections, the Tea Party successfully
helped elect dozens of legislators in a coalition that has since
metastasized into the Freedom Caucus, an enduring and powerful
radical-right wing of the Republican Party.62
Like progressive popular constitutionalist movements, the Tea
Party challenged the constitutional status quo through mobilization and
public interpretation.63 It also recognized the usefulness of connecting
with institutional actors, like the Republican party.64 Yet, the Tea
Party’s constitutional vision constrained popular democracy by limiting
which constitutional claims were deemed “legitimate” and who could
articulate said claims.65 In the Tea Party’s rhetoric, the overwhelmingly
older, whiter, and evangelical people had been shut out of politics by
corrupt, foreign-influenced politicians.66 According to Jared Goldstein,
in employing the Constitution to advocate for small government, the
Tea Party used originalism simply as the chosen rhetoric to “effectuate
their brand of popular constitutionalism.”67 The popular constitutional
component, drawing interpretive power from the people, is
paradoxically combined with an exclusionary interpretation of the
text.68
ii.

Heller and the Second Amendment Movement

The pro-gun movement, spearheaded by the National Rifle
Association, also used popular constitutionalist tactics to restructure the
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Schmidt, supra note 23, at 537.
Id. at 533-34, 538.
60 Vanessa Williamson, Theda Skocpol & John Coggin, The Tea Party and the Remaking of
Republican Conservatism, 9 PERSP. ON POL. 25, 28 (2011).
61 Id. at 26.
62 See Trost & Rosenthal, supra note 56, at 13.
63 Chip Berlet, Reframing Populist Resentments in the Tea Party Movement, in STEEP, supra
note 56, at 49.
64 Williamson et al., supra note 60, at 28-30.
65 See Berlet, supra note 63, at 58.
66 Goldstein, supra note 52, at 847-48; Williamson et al., supra note 60, at 27.
67 Goldstein, supra note 52, at 856.
68 Id. at 850.
59
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terms of the gun control argument and empower ordinary citizens.69
Through social movement action, gun rights advocates successfully
attached their interpretation of the Second Amendment to the plain
constitutional text, so much so that many Americans believe the
Constitution explicitly provides for the unlimited and unregulated
possession of firearms.70
Beyond impacting public opinion and political parties, pro-gun
social movements also influenced judicial interpretation of the Second
Amendment. Reva Siegel argues that in District of Columbia v. Heller,
the Supreme Court interpreted the Second Amendment through a
popular constitutionalist lens.71 The Heller majority, written by the
Court’s conservative originalists, utilized understandings of the Second
Amendment formed by late-twentieth century social movement
activity.72 Second Amendment social movements used language like
“law and order,” and framed their mission as a “restoration” of
constitutional language.73 Their re-definition of constitutional text was
so effective that Seigel wonders whether Justice Scalia, who wrote the
opinion, understood that his words actively took sides in the culture
war.74
D. The Contested Terms of Secularism and Religion
“What counts as religious or secular in any given context is a
function of different configurations of power.”75

69 Siegel, Dead or Alive, supra note 36, 226, 243 (explaining that the movement was organized
around “how political claims on the Second Amendment would be asserted: as an outgrowth of
a republican tradition that understood the militia as defense against government tyranny, or
as . . . concerned with the individual’s right to defend himself and his family from crime.”); A
Brief History of the NRA, NAT’L RIFLE ASS’N, https://home.nra.org/about-the-nra/ (last visited
Oct. 22, 2021).
70 Siegel, Dead or Alive, supra note 36, at 239.
71 Id. at 192. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
72 Siegel, Dead or Alive, supra note 36, at 192.
73 Id. at 220, 222-23, 236.
74 Id. at 238 (explaining how Scalia views the gun rights movement, and his ruling in support
of it, as rescuing the Founders’ Constitution from the politics of the culture war when, in fact,
he was agreeing with a very modern interpretation of the Second Amendment, popularized by
twentieth century social movements).
75 WILLIAM T. CAVANAUGH, THE MYTH OF RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE: SECULAR IDEOLOGY AND THE
ROOTS OF MODERN CONFLICT 4 (2009).
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Religious freedom, including secularism and toleration, is a
unique American achievement.76 Nonetheless, secularism and religious
freedom are not fixed concepts.77 In Warner v. Boca Raton, Judge
Ryskamp unhelpfully articulated a circular definition of religion, saying
that the religion that counts legally as religion “reflects some tenet,
practice, or custom of a larger system of religious beliefs.”78 The process
of defining religion is difficult and highly subjective, built on social
context, political pressure, and bias.79
Courts have the interpretive power to legally define what does
and does not count as protected religious activity.80 Fluctuations in
public opinion influence judicial notions of religious freedom and
impact court decisions.81 Thus, the secular legal regime does not
unilaterally prohibit religion from having a public life, but rather offers

76

WINNIFRED F. SULLIVAN, THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 1 (1st ed. 2005) (stating
that “Americans who may be able to agree on little else agree that religious freedom is one of
the shining achievements of the United States . . . .”).
77 S.N. Balagangadhara, On the Dark Side of the “Secular”: Is the Religious-Secular
Distinction a Binary?, 61 NUMEN 33, 34 (2014) (“In different historical and political contexts,
the meaning of the terms ‘religious’ and ‘secular’ has changed and the borders of the religioussecular dichotomy have shifted.”).
78 Warner v. City of Boca Raton, 64 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1282 (S.D. Fla. 1999), aff’d, 420 F.3d
1308 (11th Cir. 2005). Sullivan describes how Judge Ryskamp encompasses the American
double consciousness of separatism and Christian evangelism, one example of the overlap
between secularism and fervent Christianity. Judge Ryskamp’s dual position also demonstrate
the compatibility between secularism and Christianity, further giving credence to the conclusion
that secularism as understood today includes some fundamentally Christian framework.
SULLIVAN, supra note 76, at 6, 147.
79 SULLIVAN, supra note 76, at 1.
80 Id. at 27; Bryan K. Fair, The Excessive Entanglement of Politics, Law and Religion, 26 J.L.
& RELIGION 371, 374 (2010) (reviewing SULLIVAN, supra note 76). Courts must refrain from
stumbling into a “theological thicket” or resolving disputes on the basis of religious doctrine
and practice. See Nouri v. Dadgar, 226 A.3d 797, 809 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2020). However,
some scholars, like Jonathan Weiss, argue that “any definition of religion would seem to violate
religious freedom in that it would dictate to religions, present and future, what they must
be . . . . Furthermore, an attempt to define religion . . . would run afoul of the ‘establishment’
clause . . . . ” Jonathan Weiss, Privilege, Posture and Protection: ‘Religion’ in the Laws, 73
YALE L.J. 593, 604 (1964). Others argue that any definition or concept of religion must “account
for the multiplying forms of recognizably legitimate religious exercise.” LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1180 (2d ed. 1988). Either way, although religion remains
legally undefined, courts have increasingly interpreted religious protection in ways that
predominately safeguard mainstream Christian plaintiffs. For more work on the evolution of the
religious protection doctrine under the Roberts Court, see generally Lee Epstein & Eric A.
Posner, The Roberts Court and the Transformation of Constitutional Protections for Religion:
A Statistical Portrait, SUP. CT. REV. (forthcoming 2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3825759.
81 Nelson Tebbe, The End of Religious Freedom: What is at Stake?, 41 PEPP. L. REV. 963, 981
(2014).
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this opportunity only to those religions perceived by the public, and by
judges, as acceptable.82
The American story of religious freedom begins with the
Puritans seeking refuge from religious persecution.83 During the
revolutionary years, the Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776 codified
religious freedom: “all men are equally entitled to the free exercise of
religion, according to the dictates of conscience.”84 In 1821, Thomas
Jefferson, expanded on this proclamation, saying that religious liberty
was “meant to comprehend, within the mantle of its protection, the Jew
and the Gentile, the Christian and Mahometan, the Hindoo [sic] and
Infidel of every denomination.”85 This mandate echoed John Adams’
1797 insistence that “the government of the United States of America is
not in any sense founded on the Christian Religion.”86
The essential non-discriminatory element of religious freedom
is embodied in the Free Exercise Clause.87 The Supreme Court, in
Larson v. Valente, reaffirmed the necessity of non-discrimination,
ruling that religious freedom that applies to some faiths more than others
is not truly religious freedom.88 Finally, in West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette, the Court ruled that religious freedoms are not
just reserved for unimportant matters.89
American religious freedom hinges on a separation between
church and state.90 The Establishment Clause prohibits the government
82

PETER COVIELLO, MAKE YOURSELVES GODS: MORMONS AND THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS OF
AMERICAN SECULARISM 29 (2019). As Charles Taylor writes, “secularism as a form of mutated
religion — secularism does not cancel religion, but redefines and redistributes it.” CHARLES
TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE 15 (2007).
83 Kenneth C. Davis, America’s True History of Religious Tolerance, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Oct.
2010), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/americas-true-history-of-religious-tolerance61312684/.
84 VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS OF 1776, art. XVI; Thomas C. Berg, Religious Freedom
and Nondiscrimination, 50(1) LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 181, 181(2018).
85 James A. Sonne, Domestic Applications of Sharia and the Exercise of Ordered Liberty, 45
SETON HALL L. REV. 717, 752 (2015) (quoting THOMAS JEFFERSON, AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON (1821), reprinted in WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 66-67 (A. Lipscomb
et al. eds., 1903)).
86 Treaty of Peace and Friendship, U.S.-Tripoli, Nov. 4, 1796, art. XI, 8 Stat. 154.
87 JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS
(1785), reprinted in THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 8 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1973).
88 Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 245 (1982); Berg, supra note 84, at 182.
89 West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (“[F]reedom to differ is
not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The
test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch of the existing order.”)
90 Steven D. Smith, The Last Chapter?, 41 PEPP. L. REV. 903, 906 (2013). The first use of the
phrase “separation between church and state” is believed to have been by Thomas Jefferson in
his letter to the Danbury Baptists Association. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Messrs.
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from either establishing religion or prohibiting the freedom of religious
worship, and the Free Exercise Clause grants every person the freedom
to practice any religious principle or teach any religious doctrine.91 Both
of these clauses reflect the belief that faith is a sacred practice between
an individual and his or her God. 92 The achievement of religious
freedom is also impossible without toleration.93
Yet, scholars like Winifred Sullivan, S.N. Balagangadhara, and
Nelson Tebbe have grappled with the slippery nature of “religious” and
“secular” and the myth of religious freedom.94 In particular, secularism
remains inseparable from Christianity as it is traditionally defined as the
rational “enlightened” man’s response to religious monarchy.95 For
example, early nineteenth century religious revivalists celebrated the
Declaration of Independence as an inspirational moment of divine
Christian progress.96 To evangelical Americans, both past and present,
“[t]he self-evident, secular truths of the Declaration of Independence
[are] the truths of revealed religion.”97
During the Second Great Awakening, revivalist preachers
“recast the nation’s origins as avowedly Christian.”98 The nation’s
Nehemiah Dodge, Ephraim Robbins, and Stephen S. Nelson, a committee of the Danbury
Baptist Association in the state of Connecticut (Jan. 1, 1802) (on file with Library of Congress).
In this letter, Thomas Jefferson reinstated that religion is a matter between the individual and
God, and that everyone must respect the “supreme will of the nation in behalf of the rights of
conscience . . . . ” Id. See also Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 163 (1878); Everson v.
Board of Ed. of Ewing Tp., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
91 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”). See also Herbert Wright, Religious Liberty Under the
Constitution of the United States, 27 VA. L. REV. 75, 79 (1940).
92 See Steven J. Heyman, The Light of Nature: John Locke, Natural Rights, and the Origins of
American Religious Liberty, 101 MARQ. L. REV. 705, 769 (2018). Judge Story, in his work on
the Constitution, exemplified this belief by saying “[t]he rights of conscience are, indeed,
beyond the reach of any human power. They are given by God and can not be encroached upon
by human authority.” 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 700 (5th ed. 1891).
93 J. Judd Owen, Locke’s Case for Religious Toleration: Its Neglected Foundation in the Essay
Concerning Human Understanding, 69 J. OF POL. 156, 157 (2007) (describing how “[i]t is wrong
to impose one’s religion on others because no one truly knows which (if any) . . . religion is the
true one. The ultimate truth is unknowable.”).
94 SULLIVAN, supra note 76, at 1, 139 (arguing that religious liberty is impossible because
religion is defined too narrowly); Fair, supra note 80, at 372 (“It is difficult to locate any
organizing principle within the law of religious liberty.”); Balagangadhara, supra note 77, at 34
(“In different historical and political contexts, the meaning of the terms ‘religious’ and ‘secular’
has changed and the borders of the religious-secular dichotomy have shifted.”).
95 John R. Bowen, Secularism: Conceptual Genealogy or Political Dilemma?, 52 COMP. STUD.
SOC’Y & HIST. 680, 681 (2010).
96 JILL LEPORE, THESE TRUTHS: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 199 (2018).
97 Id.
98 Id. at 201.
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secular founding, therefore, was secular insofar as it reflected Christian
principles. Notions of liberty, religious freedom, and toleration were
understood as applied to Christian denominations in a nation founded
on Christian faith. The reimagination of religion by Second Great
Awakening revivalists was a popular constitutionalist exercise before
the judicial interpretive moniker even existed, as these preachers and
their communities proliferated their own historiography of the United
States. Current understanding of what was foundational has been
colored by these activities, making it even more difficult to combat
stereotypes and biases in today’s religious doctrine.99
Thus, secularism is not the absence of Christianity from politics,
but actually another form of its propagation.100 Gil Anidjar writes that
“secularism is a name Christianity gave itself when it invented religion,
when it named its other or others as religions.”101 To put it even more
bluntly: “[S]ecularism is Christianity.”102
i.

Historical Anti-Muslim Sentiment and Islamophobia

Since religion is a contested category, the law, both judicial and
statutory, acts as a gatekeeper, determining what counts as religion and
which groups enjoy full protections.103 In America, although
membership in the national community has expanded, whiteness and
Christianity remain stubborn pseudo-requirements.104 For example,
Native Americans, failing both of these criteria, were deemed “foreign,”
and excluded from the American national community and protection
under the law.105 Since whiteness has remained tethered to

99

Id.
See Christine M. Jacobsen, Mayanthi Fernando, & Janet Jakobsen, Gender, Sex, and
Religious Freedom in the Context of Secular Law, 113 FEMINIST REV. 93, 99 (2016). Janet
Jakobsen asserts that American religious freedom is “the freedom to act like Protestants.” Id.
101 Gil Anidjar, Secularism, 33 CRITICAL INQUIRY 52, 62 (2006); COVIELLO, supra note 82, at
43.
102 Anidjar, supra note 101, at 62; COVIELLO, supra note 82, at 249.
103 See SULLIVAN, supra note 76, at 1.
104 Nagwa Ibrahim, The Origins of Muslim Racialization in U.S. Law, 7 UCLA J. ISLAMIC &
NEAR E.L. 121, 127 (2008).
105 Id. at 128; Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 59 (1823) (“So, too, with respect to the
concomitant principle, that the Indian inhabitants are to be considered merely as occupants, to
be protected, indeed, while in peace, in the possession of their lands, but to be deemed incapable
of transferring the absolute title to others.”).
100

CANAAN

264

U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS

[VOL. 21:2

Christianity,106 Islam has long been positioned as a foreign menace.107
Fearing the spread of the “inferior” religion, the Spanish halted the
importation of Muslim slaves to the Americas between the sixteenth and
eighteenth centuries.108 After the European powers left, their orientalist
legacy remained, reflected in the racial requirements for American
citizenship.109
In the nation’s nascent years, the law also defined the national
community as white and Christian. In People v. Ruggles, in which a man
was convicted for blaspheming Jesus, presiding Justice Kent
distinguished between Muslims and Christians.110 He called Islam a
religion of imposters foreign to national policy.111 From his words, it is
clear he viewed the American people as Christians and the national
community as Christian.112 Thus, the state had to protect against those
who disturbed “the good order” by threatening Christian dominance.113
The Justice’s words are not surprising when read in context with the
Naturalization Act of 1790, which limited naturalization to “whites.”114
Subsequent cases demonstrated that, for the purposes of the Act,
106 Although whiteness is an “ever-morphing social category” that is “continually constructed,”
for many, it remains synonymous with “Western” civilization (broadly and stereotypically
defined). Matthew W. Hughey, Hegemonic Whiteness: From Structure and Agency to Identity
Allegiance, in THE CONSTRUCTION OF WHITENESS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY ANALYSIS OF RACE
FORMATION AND THE MEANING OF A WHITE IDENTITY 212-33 (Stephen Middleton et al. eds.,
2016). See also David Perry & Matthew Gabriele, Steve King Says He Was Just Defending
‘Western Civilization.’ That’s Racist, Too, WASH. POST (Jan. 15, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/01/15/steve-king-says-he-was-just-defendingwestern-civilization-thats-racist-too/.
107 Ibrahim, supra note 104, at 126.
108 Id. at 130.
109 Id. at 131. Edward Said coined the term “orientalist” to describe how the West, or the
“Occident,” perceives itself as superior to the uncivilized “Orient,” the distant land of Muslims
and Arabs. See EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM 12 (Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. 1978). Said’s
theory about orientalism continues to permeate political society and culture today. Adam Shatz,
‘Orientalism.’
Then
and
Now,
New
York
Review
(May
20,
2019),
https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2019/05/20/orientalism-then-and-now/. Most notably, Samuel
P. Huntington uses the same premises of diametrically opposed civilizational monoliths, where
the distant “Orient” is an existential threat, and inherently incompatible, with the superior,
advanced Western culture. See Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, 72(3) Foreign
Affairs 22, 31-33 (1993).
110 8 Johns. 290, 292-95 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811).
111 Id. at 295.
112 Id. at 294 (“The people of this State, in common with the people of this country, profess the
general doctrines of Christianity, as the rule of their faith and practice . . . .”).
113 Id.; Ibrahim, supra note 104, at 132.
114 Ibrahim, supra note 104, at 133; Khaled A. Beydoun, “Muslim Bans” and the Re(making)
of Political Islamophobia, 5 U. ILL. L. REV. 1733, 1741 (2017) (quoting The Naturalization Act
of 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103 (repealed 1795) (“That any alien, being a free white person, who shall
have resided within the limits and under the jurisdiction of the United States . . .”)).
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whether a person was Muslim was a determining factor in the
assessment of whiteness.115 Additionally, in 1957, the Supreme Court,
quoting from John Quincy Adams’ writings, articulated that the
Christian view of the state of nature is “a state of peace” versus
“Mahometan law of nations . . . considered the state of nature as a state
of war.”116
September 11, 2001 (9/11) and the Ground Zero Mosque
controversy reanimated historic American conceptions of Muslim
“foreignness.”117 9/11 made Muslim identity salient and visible in ways
it had not been previously.118 In large part because of the quick
organizing efforts of entrepreneurial anti-Muslim promoters, prejudiced
caricatures of Muslims—regardless and uncaring of their citizenship
status—as foreign and violent vaulted into the mainstream.119 The fear
of international terrorism further bolstered suspicions of American
Muslims.120
Faced with this perceived foreign threat, legislators invoked the
Constitution.121 In 2004, both houses of Congress considered versions
of the Constitution Restoration Act.122 Although the Act failed, it would
have acknowledged God as the source of authority in America’s legal
system, as well as permitted the impeachment of federal judges who
cited foreign or international law.123 Anti-Muslim promoters like
115 See, e.g., George Shishim v. United States (LA Super. Ct. 1909); Ex parte Shahid, 205 F.
812, 812-13 (E.D. Ct. S.C. 1913); United States v. Cartozian, 6 F.2d 919, 924-25 (Dist. Ct. Or.
1925). Those applying for citizenship had the burden of proving their “white” characteristics to
distinguish themselves as Christians versus “Mohammedan.” In re Ahmed Hassan, 48 F. Supp.
843, 844-45 (S.D. Ct. Mich. 1942). See also Beydoun, supra note 114, at 1742.
116 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 58 n.8 (1957).
117 Saeed A. Khan, Sharia Law, Islamophobia and the U.S. Constitution: New Tectonic Plates
of the Culture Wars, 12 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 123, 123 (2012); Haj
Yazdiha, Law as Movement Strategy: How the Islamophobia Movement Institutionalizes Fear
Through Legislation, 13 SOC. MOVEMENT STUD. 267, 268 (2014).
118 CHRISTOPHER BAIL, TERRIFIED: HOW ANTI-MUSLIM FRINGE ORGANIZATIONS BECAME
MAINSTREAM 44 (2014). See also The State of Things, Being “Brown” in Post 9/11 America,
BLUE RIDGE PUB. RADIO (Dec. 8, 2016), https://www.bpr.org/post/being-brown-post-911america#stream/0.
119 Beydoun, supra note 114, at 1737; NATHAN LEAN, THE ISLAMOPHOBIA INDUSTRY 70 (2012).
See also infra Section II.B.
120 Johnson, supra note 10, at 189.
121 Martha F. Davis & Johanna Kalb, Oklahoma and Beyond: Understanding the Wave of State
Anti-Transnational Law Initiatives, 87 IND. L.J. SUPP. 1, 3 (2011).
122 Id.; Khan, supra note 117, at 138.
123 Constitutional Restoration Act of 2004, H.R. 3799, 108th Cong. §101(a) (2004) (“[T]he
Supreme Court shall not have jurisdiction to review . . . any matter to the extent that relief is
sought against an element of Federal, State, or local government . . . by reason of that element’s
or officer’s acknowledgment of God as the sovereign source of law, liberty, or government.”);
Khan, supra note 117, at 138; Davis & Kalb, supra note 121.
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Pamela Geller, David Horowitz, Robert Spencer, and Frank Gaffney
also began organizing.124 They formed tight-knit groups and a dense
anti-Muslim network that worked together to reinforce their central
claims that Muslims had infiltrated the U.S. government and that every
mosque was a sleeper cell for al-Qaeda, the Muslim Brotherhood, or
Hamas.125 Over the past ten years, these groups have been funded by
almost $40 million from seven major foundations.126 Absent a coherent,
legal definition of religion, the anti-sharia law movement offers its own
interpretation.127 Yet this interpretation is built upon historic stereotypes
of Muslims as inherently dangerous and un-American, and sharia as a
totalitarian, foreign, and military force.
II.

ANTI-SHARIA LAWS AND DEFINING ACCEPTABLE RELIGION

Since the meanings of secularism and religion are so blurred,
interpretive methods employed by judges and civil society determine
where the borders are.128 Yet the most influential civil society actors
asserting their definitions of religion and secularism related to Islam are
anti-Muslim groups promoting anti-sharia laws.129 Anti-sharia laws, and
the activism essential to their passage, shape American public attitudes
124 LEAN, supra note 119, at 70. Pamela Geller co-founded the American Freedom Defense
Initiative, which organized the infamous “Draw Mohammad” competition in Houston, Texas.
David K. Shipler, Pamela Geller and the Anti-Islam Movement, New Yorker (May 12, 2015),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/pamela-geller-and-the-anti-islammovement?source=search_google_dsa_paid&gclid=CjwKCAiAzrWOBhBjEiwAq85QZ3hSIe
rCx1my2fc1tvxWwZuUDoYJ5p3BveOaFY5O_3UQqoa0v-7HLxoCYZkQAvD_BwE.
She
originally made her name as a vocal opponent of the Park 51 Islamic Center project in
Manhattan. Pamela Geller, Southern Policy Law Center, https://www.splcenter.org/fightinghate/extremist-files/individual/pamela-geller. David Horowitz is the founder of the David
Horowtiz Freedom Center, which works to “combat[] the efforts of the radical left and its
Islamist allies to destroy American values and disarm this country as it attempts to defend itself
in a time of terror.” About David Horowitz Freedom Center, David Horowitz Freedom Center,
https://www.horowitzfreedomcenter.org/about. Robert Spencer is the director of the blog Jihad
Watch, the co-founder of Stop Islamization of America, and the author of numerous anti-Muslim
books.
About
Robert
Spencer
and
Staff
Writers,
Jihad
Watch,
https://www.jihadwatch.org/about-robert. Frank Gaffney is the president of the Center for
Security Policy and a well-known conspiracist. For example, Gaffney believes that President
Obama was secretly Muslim, and has also postulated that Saddam Hussein masterminded the
Oklahoma City bombing. Philip Bump, Meet Frank Gaffney, the anti-Muslim Gadfly Reportedly
Advising Donald Trump’s Transition Team, WASH. POST (Nov. 16, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/12/08/meet-frank-gaffney-the-antimuslim-gadfly-who-produced-donald-trumps-anti-muslim-poll/.
125 LEAN, supra note 119, at 14. See also BAIL, supra note 118, at 57
126 Yazdiha, supra note 117, at 268.
127 SULLIVAN, supra note 76, at 15.
128 See infra Section I.D.
129 See infra Section I.D.

CANAAN

2021]

IN BAD FAITH

267

towards Islam, normalizing the perceived inherent threat of Islam to
American values.130 This Section argues that allowing social
movements to make sense of the inherently unstable phenomena of
secularism and religion leads to a regressive reality that perpetuates
harmful anti-Muslim stereotypes. Section II.A briefly explores the
history of the anti-sharia law agenda, as well as the various types of antisharia legislation.131 Section II.B examines the use of popular
constitutionalism by anti-Muslim social movements, specifically ACT
for America and the Center for Security Policy, and how it has
influenced the text of anti-sharia laws.132
A. Oklahoma’s SQ755
Anti-sharia laws are the crown jewel of the anti-Muslim agenda.
First proposed in 2007, early incarnations intended to make adherence
to sharia “a felony punishable by twenty years in prison.”133 In
November 2010, seventy percent of Oklahoma voters approved an
amendment to the state’s constitution entitled “Save Our State”
(hereinafter referred to as SQ755).134 The ballot initiative to amend
Section 1, Article VII of the Oklahoma Constitution added the
following:
State and Municipal courts, when exercising their
judicial authority, shall uphold and adhere to the law as
provided in the United States Constitution, the
130

Social movements and anti-Muslim organizations are critical to the normalization of
Islamophobia. Christopher Bail examines how anti-Muslim fringe organizations have been
mainstreamed and influenced the U.S. government and civil society at large. Many of these
organizations dominate the media landscape, and, along with supporting anti-sharia law
initiatives, protest outside of mosques, stack school boards to monitor textbooks for pro-Muslim
bias, train federal and local counterterrorism agents to spot threats, and infiltrate Muslim
community organizations. See BAIL, supra note 118. For example, according to Bail, after 9/11,
mainstream media outlets hosted self-anointed “terrorism experts,” like Robert Spencer and
Frank Gaffney. Id. at 78. Additionally, groups “that displayed anger or fear averaged more than
twenty times more media influence than all other civil society organizaitons.” Id. at 57.
131 See infra Section II.A.
132 See infra Section II.B.
133 WAJAHAT ALI ET AL., CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, FEAR, INC.: THE ROOTS OF THE
ISLAMOPHOBIA NETWORK IN AMERICA 1, 36 (2011) https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wpcontent/uploads/issues/2011/08/pdf/islamophobia.pdf. Since this first iteration, the language
of the template bill has changed and no longer directly mentions sharia or Islam. However, the
history of the legislation is evident of its continued purpose. Id. at 40.
134 Khan, supra note 117, at 130; Lee Ann Bambach, Save Us from Save Our State: AntiSharia Legislation Efforts Across the United States and Their Impact, 13 J. ISLAMIC L. &
CULTURE 72, 78 (2011).
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Oklahoma Constitution, the United States Code, federal
regulations promulgated pursuant thereto, established
common law, the Oklahoma Statutes and rules
promulgated pursuant thereto, and if necessary the law
of another state of the United States provided the law of
the other state does not include Sharia Law, in making
judicial decisions. The courts shall not look to the legal
precepts of other nations or cultures. Specifically, the
courts shall not consider international law or Sharia Law.
The provisions of this subsection shall apply to all cases
before the respective courts including, but not limited to,
cases of first impression.135
As soon as the electoral results were publicized, Muneer Awad,
a Muslim-American and the executive director of the Oklahoma branch
of the Council of American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), challenged the
amendment’s constitutionality.136 He alleged that the amendment
violated the First Amendment’s Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses.137 In granting a preliminary injunction, the district court judge
highlighted that the amendment’s purpose was unambiguously to single
out and restrict sharia law.138 The law, lacking neutrality and
justification by a compelling government interest, was constitutionally
invalid.139

135 Davis & Kalb, supra note 121, at 1. The Attorney General of Oklahoma determined that the
original proposed ballot title “did not comply with applicable laws” and “did not adequately
explain the effect of the proposition because it [did] not explain what either Sharia Law or
International Law is.” Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1118 (10th Cir. 2012) (citing OKL. CONST.
art. VII, §1) (alteration in original) (citations omitted). Following this, the bill included
definitions of international, foreign, and Sharia Law. Id. Sharia Law was defined as “Islamic
law . . . based on . . . the Koran and the teachings of Mohammad.” Id. (internal citations
omitted).
136
Bambach, supra note 134, at 78; Oklahoma International and Sharia Law, State Question
755
(2010),
BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Oklahoma_International_and_Sharia_Law,_State_Question_755_(2010
) (last visited Jan. 23, 2020).
137 Pedrioli, supra note 10, at 76; Khan, supra note 117, at 135; Eun-Jung Katherine Kim,
Islamic Law in American Courts: Good, Bad, and Unsustainable Uses, 28 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 287, 292 (2014).
138 Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1306 (W.D. Okla. 2010); aff’d 670 F.3d 1111 (10th
Cir. 2012). Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1306 (W.D. Okla. 2010); aff’d 670 F.3d
1111 (10th Cir. 2012).
139 See Awad, 670 F.3d at 1130 (holding that because there was a lack of evidence of any
concrete issue, there was no compelling government interest).
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The Tenth Circuit upheld the District Court’s finding of
unconstitutionality.140 In assessing whether a compelling interest was
present, the court dismissed Oklahoma’s single sentence justification on
the law’s objective.141 The court also found that Oklahoma did not cite
any instance where an Oklahoma court had applied sharia law, “let alone
that such applications had resulted in concrete problems in
Oklahoma.”142
Following this ruling, legislators then attempted to sever the
offensive language about sharia from the bill, but an Oklahoma district
court ruled against severance.143 Reviewing the statements of SQ755’s
legislative sponsors, as well as public debates and advertisements, the
court still determined that it was abundantly clear that the amendment’s
primary purpose was to protect Oklahoma from a perceived “threat” of
sharia law.144
Despite the Tenth Circuit’s holding, SQ755 has inspired dozens
of similar bills and amendments.145 Between 2010 and 2016, 194 antiMuslim bills were introduced in thirty-nine states, with a total of
eighteen enacted into law in twelve states.146 In 2017, at least three states
passed anti-sharia legislation, including Texas and Arkansas.147 In 2018,
fourteen states passed similar legislation.148

140

Id. at 1133.
Id. at 1130.
142 Id.
143 Awad v. Ziriax, 966 F. Supp. 2d 1198, 1206 (W.D. Okla. 2013).
144 Id.
145 ELSADIG ELSHEIKH ET AL., HAAS INST. FOR A FAIR AND INCLUSIVE SOC’Y, LEGALIZING
OTHERING:
THE
UNITED
STATES
OF
ISLAMOPHOBIA
4,
7
(2017),
https://haasinstitute.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/haas_institute_legalizing_othering_the_uni
ted_states_of_islamophobia.pdf (demonstrating that in 2010, 14 bills were introduced. In 2011,
56 bills were introduced. In 2012, 25 bills were introduced. In 2013, 35 bills were introduced.
In 2014, 15 bills were introduced. In 2015, 35 bills were introduced. In 2016, 14 bills were
introduced.). See also Aaron Fellmeth, International Law & Foreign Laws in the U.S. State
Legislatures,
AM.
SOC’Y
INT’L
L.:
INSIGHTS
(May
26,
2011),
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/15/issue/13/international-law-and-foreign-laws-us-statelegislatures.
146 Elsheikh, et al., supra note 145, at 10.
147 Tracking
Anti-Muslim Legislation Across the U.S., S. POVERTY L. CTR.,
https://www.splcenter.org/data-projects/tracking-anti-muslim-legislation-across-us (last visited
on Nov. 11, 2021). See also Islamophobia, OTHERING & BELONGING INST. AT U.C. BERKELEY,
https://belonging.berkeley.edu/islamophobia (last visited on Nov. 11, 2021).
148 David Yerushalmi, S. POVERTY L. CTR., https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremistfiles/individual/david-yerushalmi (last visited on Jan. 23, 2020). The states were Idaho, South
Dakota, Arizona, Texas, Oklahoma, Arizona, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia,
Florida, Tennessee, South Carolina, and North Carolina. Id.
141
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SQ755 is emblematic of the first wave of anti-sharia bills, those
that explicitly name sharia or Islamic law in their text.149 By naming
sharia in their text, these laws target one religion over another and grant
a denominational preference.150 Thus, they must satisfy a strict scrutiny
standard.151 However, the bills that followed SQ755 learned from its
legal complications.152 Rather than explicitly name sharia or Islam,
these second-wave statutes either prohibit or limit the application of
religious laws generally or prohibit or limit the application of foreign
law.153 Since they are facially neutral, these laws are evaluated under
the lower standards of rational basis or disparate impact analysis.154
149

Muhammad Elsayed, Contracting into Religious Law: Anti-Sharia Enactments and the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 937, 937, 943 (2013)
(explaining that Oklahoma’s “Save Our State Amendment” is a part of anti-foreign law and antireligion enactments specifically targeting Sharia law). See Sonne, supra note 85, at 743
(explaining that support of the Oklahoma law could not point to a problem caused by sharia law
in the state); A.B.A. House of Delegates, Resolution 113A (2011) (opposing blanket
prohibitions on consideration of foreign laws or an entire body of religious laws). These
provisions have been introduced in Oklahoma, Arizona, South Carolina, and Wyoming. See
David Yerushalmi, supra note 148.
150 CYNTHIA BROUGHER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R41824, APPLICATION OF RELIGIOUS LAW IN U.S.
COURTS: SELECTED LEGAL ISSUES 6 (2011).
151 Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982) (“[W]hen we are presented with a state law
granting a denominational preference, our precedents demand that we treat the law as suspect
and that we apply strict scrutiny in adjudging its constitutionality.”). The Minnesota Charitable
Solicitation Act imposed registration and reporting requirements on religious organizations who
solicit more than fifty percent of their funds from nonmembers. Id. at 231-32. The Unification
Church opposed the Act as violative of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses. Id. at 23334. Laws addressing the constitutionality of the exercise of religion must be justified by a
compelling government interest and must be narrowly tailored to pursue that interest. Church of
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531-32 (1993). See also Everson
v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (upholding a New Jersey statute permitting
reimbursement to parents of children attending parochial schools for bus transportation). But
see Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 109 (1968) (invalidating an Arkansas “anti-evolution”
statute, which made it illegal to teach about evolution or to use a textbook that teaches
evolution).
152 Johnson, supra note 10, at 197.
153 Berg, supra note 84, at 186; Sonne, supra note 85, at 743; Davis & Kalb, supra note 121, at
4; Elsayed, supra note 149, at 944.
154
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (holding that “a law, neutral on its face and
serving ends otherwise within the power of government to pursue, is [not] invalid under the
Equal Protection Clause simply because it may affect a greater proportion of one race than of
another.”). See also Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979) (recognizing
“that when a neutral law has a disparate impact upon a group that has historically been the victim
of discrimination, an unconstitutional purpose may still be at work,” but this does not mean that
the case enjoys strict scrutiny). Even though the standard of review is lower, the Religion
Clauses still require the government to minimize the extent to which it supports or condones
either religious belief or disbelief. Elsayed supra note 149, at 962 (citing Douglas Laycock,
Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993,
1001 (1989-1990)). Anti-sharia laws masquerading as foreign law limitations are both the most
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While these second-wave statutes are facially neutral, a
contextual examination makes clear that they are still intended to
constrain Islam.155 For example, referencing a 2012 Kansas bill,
Republican State Senator Chris Steineger said “This [bill] doesn’t say
‘Sharia law,’ . . . but that’s how it was marketed.”156 Although their
facial neutrality saves them from strict scrutiny, these laws still
implicate the Free Exercise Clause since, “the law at issue discriminates
against some or all religious beliefs or prohibits conduct because it has
been undertaken for religious reasons.”157
B. The Use of Popular Constitutionalism
Regardless of the type of bill, the anti-sharia law movement uses
popular constitutionalism as a framing tool to support both its
perception of Islam and larger redefinition of secularism and religion.158
Anti-sharia law activists strategically use historic nativism, xenophobia,
and racism to legitimize their claims that Islam is a foreign threat.159 For
anti-sharia law proponents, the very existence of sharia, conceptualized
as a totalitarian military-political regime, is anathema to the American
values of freedom of religion, freedom of speech, due process, and
privacy.160 Inevitably then, they conclude Islam threatens American
justice and rule of law.161
Anti-sharia law promoters cite the New Jersey case S.D. v. M.J.R
as evidence of the danger of Islam and its’ incompatibility with
American values.162 The case concerned a Moroccan Muslim couple.163
After constant abuse, the wife sought a restraining order against her
constitutionally sound and the most dangerous. The majority of these laws prohibit courts from
enforcing any foreign law that would result in a violation of the state or federal constitution or
offend public policy. Sonne, supra note 85, at 748. A minority of these laws prohibit courts
from considering the laws of any foreign system that is not appropriately aligned with the state
or federal constitution, irrespective of whether the specific law in question itself violates state
or federal constitutional law. Id
155 Sonne, supra note 85, at 746.
156 Abed Awad, The True Story of Sharia in American Courts, NATION (June 14, 2012),
https://www.thenation.com/article/true-story-sharia-american-courts/.
157 Church of the Lukumi Bablu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532 (1993).
158 Yazdiha, supra note 117, at 269, 273; LEAN, supra note 119, at 14.
159 See Yazdiha, supra note 117, at 270; Johnson, supra note 10, at 193.
160 Yazdiha, supra note 117, at 271; Why American Laws for American Courts?, AM. L. FOR
AM. CTS., http://americanlawsforamericancourts.com/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2021); CTR. FOR
SEC. POL’Y, SHARIAH: THE THREAT TO AMERICA: AN EXERCISE IN COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS
(REPORT OF TEAM B II) (2010) [hereinafter “CSP 2010”].
161 Johnson, supra note 10, at 192.
162 2 A.3d 412 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010).
163 Id. at 413.
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husband, alleging that he forced her to have sex against her will.164 Her
husband said that he was entitled to sex upon demand per his religious
beliefs.165 An imam testified that, in accordance with Islamic law, a wife
must comply with her husband’s sexual demands.166 The trial court
judge denied the wife’s request, holding that since the husband acted in
accordance with his religious beliefs, he did not meet the criminal intent
threshold.167 The New Jersey Appellate Court reversed this ruling,
finding that the trial court had improperly permitted religious protection
to override fundamental liberties.168 Yet the anti-sharia law movement
continues to point to this case as evidence of the threat sharia poses to
American liberties.169
S.D. v. M.J.R is also used to demonstrate the failure of the
judiciary.170 According to anti-sharia law activists, judges on their own
cannot, or will not, protect against the infiltration of Islam and sharia
law; therefore, people must stand up and demand a change.171
Legislation, the emblematic representative of democratic activity, is the
perfect solution for a movement that positions itself as a citizen-driven
campaign to safeguard the Constitution.172
i.

Template Legislation - American Laws for American
Courts

American Laws for American Courts (ALAC), David
Yerushalmi’s template bill and the preeminent model for anti-sharia
164

Id. at 415-16.
Id. at 416.
166 Id. at 417-18.
167 Id. at 418.
168 Id. at 428. The court used the testimony of the couple’s imam when determining whether
the sexual behavior was religiously sanctioned. The imam “confirmed that a wife must comply
with her husband’s sexual demands,” but also said “a husband was forbidden from approaching
his wife ‘like any animal.’” Id. at 417-18. The imam also “acknowledged that New Jersey law
considered coerced sex between married people to be rape.” Id. at 418. This testimony was used
to set up a conflict between religious and civil law, but the imam’s comments make clear that
religious law does not fully condone this kind of behavior in the simplistic way it was presented.
Id. at 417-18.
169 THE CTR. FOR SEC. POL’Y, SHARIAH IN AMERICAN COURTS: THE EXPANDING INCURSION OF
ISLAMIC LAW IN THE U.S.LEGAL SYSTEM 23 (2014) [hereinafter “CSP 2014”].
170 S.D., 2 A.3d at 422.
171 CSP 2014, supra note 169, at 13-14, 16. CSP 2014 presents the top twenty cases that
illuminate the “expanding incursion of Islamic law” into American courts, and the inability to
judges to protect against it. Id. at 1. Along with S.D. v. M.J.R., these cases also include Chaudry
v. Chaudry, 388 A.2d 1000 (N.J. Super. 1978), Hosain v. Malik, 671 A.2d 988 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1996), and In re Marriage of Obaidi, 227 P. 3d 787 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010), amongst others.
See CSP 2014, supra note 169, at 1.
172 Yazdiha, supra note 117, at 271.
165
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laws, utilizes popular constitutionalist tactics to define Islam as
areligious.173 Yerushalmi’s devotion to the anti-sharia cause began with
his 2006 founding of the Society of Americans for National Existence
(SANE), a non-profit organization opposed to sharia.174 SANE’s name
invokes a certain type of “American,” and implicitly delineates who is
and is not part of that community. This “Society of Americans,”
ostensibly representative of the people, is diametrically opposed to
sharia, underscoring the menace of the latter.175 Yerushalmi’s initial
focus on state-level legislation was born of necessity after his initiatives
failed to gain traction at a federal level.176 Capitalizing on the Tea
Party’s explosive grassroots momentum, Yerushalmi refined his state
legislature project with ALAC at the center.177
The website of the American Public Policy Alliance (APPA),
SANE's successor organization, situates the group’s mission within the
constitutional tradition, invoking the Declaration of Independence and
the Constitution and describing the American Revolution as a struggle
against the imposition of foreign power and foreign laws.178 In APPA’s
view, the tyranny of foreign laws was and continues to be a threat to
“unique American values of liberty and freedom.”179 Additionally, in
response to the assertion that ALAC unfairly targets Muslims, the FAQ
page for the template ALAC legislation says that ALAC is facially
neutral and only applies to legal doctrines.180 It underscores that the law
is not focused on religion, but rather on “any foreign law that violates
constitutionally protected liberties.”181 Under ALAC, sharia is a system
of un-American foreign laws, intent on invading and destroying
constitutionally protected freedoms. 182
173

Andrea Elliott, The Man Behind the Anti-Shariah Movement, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 2011),
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/31/us/31shariah.html.
174 Elsheikh et al., supra note 145, at 18; Elliott, supra note 173.
175 Elsheikh et al., supra note 145, at 18. At this time, Yerushalmi also proposed a law that
likened the observance of Islamic law to sedition. Id.
176 Elliott, supra note 173.
177 Id.
178 American
Laws
for
American
Courts,
AM.
PUB.
POL’Y
ALL.,
http://ibh.554.myftpupload.com/legislation/american-laws-for-american-courts/ (last visited
Jan. 23, 2020).
179 Id.; CSP 2014, supra note 169, at 65 (“Application of foreign law—particularly Shariah—
in American courts, can deny Americans their unique values of liberty . . . .”).
180 Frequently Asked Questions, Issues, and Objections, AM. L. FOR AM. CTS.,
http://americanlawsforamericancourts.com/faqs/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2020).
181 Id.
182 Id. In response to the concern that ALAC is unnecessary because it is already the reality in
state courts, APPA says that there are many cases where foreign laws are invoked by parties in
dispute. AM. PUB. POL’Y ALL., supra note 178. Even if states bar foreign laws if they violate the
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Finally, while the passage of legislation is an important
objective, Yerushalmi’s ultimate project is much bigger; he aims to reeducate society on Islam by dictating the terms of the conversation.183
As he says, “If [ALAC] passed in every state without any friction, it
would have not served its purpose . . . . The purpose was heuristic — to
get people asking the question, ‘What is Shariah [sic]?’”184
ii.

The Role of Social Movements

SANE, and its later transition into APPA, are just two examples
of the larger anti-Muslim constellation of think tanks, grassroots groups,
and big donors.185 The different components of the network repeat
similar talking points to perpetuate and entrench prejudiced stereotypes
of Islam.186 By combining grassroots and institutionalized social
movements, in the form of ACT for America (ACT) and the Center for
Security Policy (CSP) respectively, anti-sharia law activists impact
party systems and alter public opinions, maximizing the reach of their
interpretation of Islam and religion.187
Although more focus will be paid to ACT and CSP in this
Article, many other anti-sharia law promoters invoke both the
Constitution and anti-Muslim stereotypes. Daniel Pipes, the head of the
Middle East Forum, justified anti-sharia laws in order to “protect the

state’s public policy, it is unclear what the threshold for violations actually are, which is why
anti-sharia laws are necessary. Id.
183 Elliott, supra note 173.
184 Id.
185 BAIL, supra note 118, at 78; LEAN, supra note 119, at 70. The Center for American Progress
explores the tripartite Islamophobia Network. ALI ET AL., supra note 133, at 4. The seven major
funders are (1) Donors Capital Fund, (2) The Richard Mellon Scaife Foundation, (3) the Lynde
and Harry Bradley Foundation, (4) the Russell Berrie Foundation, (5) the Becker Foundations,
(6) the Anchorage Foundation/William Rosenwald Family Fund, and (7) the Fairbrook
Foundation. The self-appointed experts are Frank Gaffney, Daniel Pipes, David Yerushalmi,
Robert Spencer, and Steven Emerson. Id. The grassroots organizations are ACT! for America,
Stop Islamization of America, the Tea Party, the Tennessee Freedom Coalition, and the
American Family Association. Id. at 5. According to a 2019 report, “nationwide, groups ‘whose
primary purpose it to promote prejudice against, or hatred of, Islam and Muslims’ took in about
$206 million between 2008 and 2013.” Mark Olade & Dustin Gardiner, The Network Behind
State Bills ‘Countering’ Sharia Law and Terrorism, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (July 18, 2019),
https://publicintegrity.org/politics/state-politics/copy-paste-legislate/many-state-bills-onesource-behind-the-push-to-ban-sharia-law/.
186 FAIZA PATEL ET AL., CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, LEGAL UNCERTAINTIES AND PRACTICAL
PROBLEMS
1-4
(2013),
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/05/ForeignLawBans.pdf.
187 See TARROW, supra note 47, at 1; see also Balkin, How Social Movements Change, supra
note 37, at 30.
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Constitutional order from Middle Eastern threats.”188 Similarly, Robert
Spencer of Stop Islamization of Nations writes that the “denial of
equality of rights and dignity remains part of the Sharia, and, as such,
[is] part of the legal superstructure that global jihadists are laboring to
restore everywhere in the Islamic world, and wish ultimately to impose
on the entire human race.”189 David Horowitz, of the eponymous
Freedom Center, underscored the necessity of anti-sharia laws to
“combat the efforts of the radical left and its Islamist allies to destroy
American values.”190 Finally, Pamela Geller, of the Atlas Shrugs blog
and the Draw Mohammad competition, urged the necessity of
“mobiliz[ing] citizens to fight Islam, the ‘sinister agenda that could do
nothing less than destroy the United States.’”191
a. ACT for America
ACT for America (ACT) believes it is returning power to the
people to enact change and safeguard national security and American
values, an essential component of both a legitimate grassroots group and
popular constitutionalism.192 It is a self-anointed “citizen action network
that promotes public policies and legislation that defend America and
democratic values against the terror and tyranny of radical Islam.”193 In
188

The Middle East Forum, DANIEL PIPES: MIDDLE E. F., https://www.danielpipes.org/mef.php
(last visited Nov 16, 2021); Yazdiha, supra note 117, at 271.
189 Why Jihad Watch?, JIHAD WATCH, https://www.jihadwatch.org/why-jihad-watch (last
visited Nov 16, 2021).
190 About
David Horowitz Freedom Center, DAVID HOROWITZ FREEDOM CTR.,
https://www.horowitzfreedomcenter.org/about (last visited Nov 16, 2021); Yazdiha, supra note
117, at 271.
191 Yazdiha, supra note 117, at 271 (citation omitted).
192 Our Mission, ACT FOR AM., https://www.actforamerica.org/Mission (last visited Nov 16,
2021) (stating that ACT’s “mission is to engage, train, and mobilize citizens to ensure the safety
and security of Americans against all threats foreign and domestic while preserving civil
liberties guaranteed by the US Constitution.”). ACT is actually a hybrid group that combines
both grassroots and institutionalized tactics because of its unique protest cycle origin story.
Isabelle M. Canaan, Institutionalization Without Formalization: The Puzzle of Mid-Protest
Cycle Entrants and ACT for America (unpublished MPhil thesis, University of Oxford) (on file
with author). ACT promotes itself as a grassroots organization, while continuing to emphasize
institutionalized strategies (like lobbying and legislation) rather than large-scale
disruption/protests. Id. However, for the purpose of this Comment, ACT will be used as an
example of the more grassroots dimension, and especially the perceived grassroots power, over
the anti-sharia law movement. Id.
193 Yazdiha, supra note 117, at 271. ACT has sanitized its language as of late, and now refers
to itself as: “The nation’s premier national security grassroots movement.” See ACT FOR AM.,
https://www.actforamerica.org/ (last visited Nov 16, 2021). ACT claims to have over one
million members. Id. Yet, as evident in its organizational materials, one of the group’s central
tenets is “An Organized Minority is Louder Than a Silent Majority.” ACT FOR AM., KEEP
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2010, ACT’s self-reported organizational mission on its 990 tax form
was “to establish a means for all American citizens to provide a
collective voice (I) for the democratic values of western civilization and
(II) against the threat of radical Islam.”194
As the faithful arbiter of the people’s will, ACT both constructs
and reflects their wishes.195 These desires include anti-sharia laws. Even
before Yerushalmi released ALAC, ACT spearheaded an initiative
entitled “Stop Sharia Now” to increase public awareness of the threat of
creeping sharia in America.196 ACT successfully used classic popular
constitutionalist tactics to change public opinion and make reasonable
their notion of pervasive, threatening sharia.197
Since 2010, ACT has also fulfilled the second goal of a social
movement—to pressure politicians through organized local action.198 In
2010, in support of an anti-sharia law campaign targeting state-level
initiatives, including SQ755, ACT provided bottom-up pressure to
convince legislators that the people were behind the campaign. 199 ACT
“direct[ed] its membership to letter-writing campaigns, petitions, and,

AMERICA SAFE: ACT ACTIVIST GUIDE 2 (2020),
https://www.actforamerica.org/sites/default/files/ActivismPacket2020UpdatedLinks07062020.
pdf. Thus, the group is focused on maximizing grassroots power to create the perception that
the majority shares its warped opinion. Id. For more information on ACT’s activist and
grassroots strategy, see ACT for America, Activist Material,
https://www.actforamerica.org/activact-material (last visited Nov 16, 2021).
194 U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., IRS, FORM 990 FILED BY ACT! FOR AMERICA 2 (2010),
https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/display_990/260772227/2011_12_EO%2F260772227_990O_201012 (tax return of organization exempt from income tax).
195 These tactics could also be classified as a form of right-wing populism, which attempts to
undermine democracy by taking advantage of its own flaws and praised tenets. See Linda Bos
et al., An Experimental Test of the Impact of Style and Rhetoric on the Perception of RightWing Populist and Mainstream Party Leaders, 48(2) ACTA POLITICA 192, 194 (2013) (quoting
Cas Mudde, The Populist Zeitgeist, 39 GOV’T & OPPOSITION 541, 543 (2014) (“The populist
rhetoric consists of an anti-establishment appeal or anti-elitism, and the celebration of the
heartland, which is . . . a place ‘in which, in the populist imagination, a virtuous and unified
population resides.’ Populism ‘considers society to be ultimately separated into homogeneous
and antagonistic groups, “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite”’ . . . .”). ACT frames its
work, and its audience, in a distinctly populist way, by bifurcating the population between the
pure people and the corrupt elite who, in this case, are facilitating the Muslim takeover of the
United States. See About ACT, ACT FOR AMERICA, https://www.actforamerica.org/aboutact
(last visited Nov 16, 2021).
196 ACT! For America, ISLAMOPHOBIA NETWORK, https://islamophobianetwisl.com/echochamber/act-for-america/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2021).
197 ALI ET AL., supra note 133, at 67. Per Balkin’s formulation, this is the tactic of moving an
“off-the-wall” argument into the realm of the possible. Balkin, How Social Movements Change,
supra note 37, at 38.
198 U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., supra note 194; ALI ET AL., supra note 133, at 68-69.
199 LEAN, supra note 119, at 138.
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specific Twitter hashtags.”200 En route to SQ755’s electoral victory,
ACT spent $60,000 on telephone campaigns and radio
advertisements.201
ACT’s distortion of public discourse around sharia and Islam
goes beyond its support for anti-sharia laws. Like Yerushalmi, ACT’s
central focus is on citizen education.202 In pursuit of this goal, ACT
works to change public opinion and impact political parties by
conducting “Citizen in Action” training conferences to teach concerned
citizens how to pressure local legislators to support local legislation.203
ACT also educates its members on the incompatibility between Islam
and the United States.204 Brigitte Gabriel, ACT’s founder and head, has
said that a practicing Muslim cannot be a loyal American citizen and
that Muslims should not be trusted in elected office, as they will always
choose Islam over the country.205 Furthermore, on June 10, 2017, ACT
held “Marches Against Sharia” in nearly two dozen cities and nineteen
states.206 All of these efforts are intended to normalize the belief that
Islam threatens real America.
b. The Center for Security Policy (CSP)
While ACT’s grassroots elements motivate and legitimize the
anti-sharia law project, CSP provides evidence of the threat. Since 2009,
Frank Gaffney, CSP’s leader, has worked closely with Yerushalmi on
200 BAIL, supra note 118, at 111; Mobashra Tazamal, Is ACT for America Really a Grassroots
Organization?,
GEO.
BRIDGE
INITIATIVE
(Sept.
10,
2018),
https://bridge.georgetown.edu/research/is-act-for-america-really-a-grassroots-organization/.
201 BAIL, supra note 118, at 111; LEAN, supra note 119, at 138; Elliott, supra note 173.
202 See ALI ET AL., supra note 133, at 65.
203 Id.
at
67-68.
See
also
Activist
Registration,
ACT
FOR
AM.,
https://www.actforamerica.org/join-the-movement (last visited Oct. 22, 2021) (providing links
for individuals to “Start a Chapter” or “Register a Group” with ACT and join in its mission to
“educate, train, and mobilize citizens to strategically organize on the local level”).
204 ALI ET AL., supra note 133, at 65.
205 Peter Beinart, America’s Most Prominent Anti-Muslim Activist Is Welcome at the White
House,
ATLANTIC
(Mar.
21,
2017)
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/03/americas-most-anti-muslim-activist-iswelcome-at-the-white-house/520323/; Chris Rodda, Maher Season Premiere Includes
Islamophobe Who Said Muslim-Americans Shouldn’t Be Allowed to Hold Public Office,
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 6, 2017, 5:12 AM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/maher-seasonpremiere-inc_b_168972.
206 Kurtis Lee & Jenny Jarvie, Anti-Sharia Rallies Around the U.S. Denounce Islam While
Stoking Concerns Among Muslim Groups, L.A. TIMES (June 10, 2017, 9:00 PM),
https://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-anti-muslim-rallies-20170610-story.html;
Hatewatch
Staff, Live-Blog: ACT for America’s “March Against Sharia” Rallies, S. POVERTY L. CTR. (June
10, 2017), https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2017/06/10/live-blog-act-americas-marchagainst-sharia-rallies.
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the anti-sharia law project.207 In 2010, CSP released a report entitled
“Shariah: The Threat to America.”208 The report begins by presenting
the dichotomy between sharia and traditional American values, like
equal treatment and individual liberty.209 It states that those who support
sharia stand for objectives that are incompatible with the U.S.
Constitution, the civil rights therein guaranteed, and the representative
government so authorized.210 Sharia is thus depicted as a destructive
threat intended to undermine American society and values, including
the “bedrock proposition[s] that the governed have a right to make law
for themselves” and “the republican democracy governed by the
Constitution . . . .”211 Additionally, a 2016 CSP Report states that sharia
is a body of law, not faith, and “must be seen as an illegal effort to
supplant our Constitution with another legal code, not a religious
practice protected by the document.”212
Similar to how SANE’s name implies at a certain understanding
of who counts as “the people,” CSP intentionally creates an exclusive
community primed to stop the sharia threat.213 Citing the Declaration of
Independence, CSP explains how all power in the United States is
derived from “We the People.” The Constitution does not exist
independently of the people; it is the people who are the “founding
entity.”214 By voluntarily safeguarding their rights in the Constitution,
with the American government acting as steward, the people, according
to CSP, acted “in their sovereign capacity.”215 Today, because of the

207

Elliott, supra note 173.
CSP 2010, supra note 160.
209 Id. at 6-7.
210 Id.
211 Id.
212 CTR. FOR SEC. POL’Y, SHARIAH: THE THREAT TO AMERICA: ABRIDGED 25 (2016) [hereinafter
CSP 2016].
213 CSP 2010, supra note 160, at 5-6. Identity-formation is a complex process. Identity is highly
contested, evolving, political, and non-neutral. Identity and group-belonging are powerful in
that they are cognitive maps used to make sense of one’s place in the social world. See GOPAL
BALAKRISHNAN, MAPPING THE NATION (1996). The presumption that identity is constructed is
not fully accepted (the primordial school on ethnic and national identity stubbornly continued
to exist), yet scholarship is moving towards a study of identity as unstable and created. See
Henry Hale, Explaining Ethnicity, 37 COMP. POL. STUD. 458 (2004); Kanchan Chandra, What is
Ethnic Identity and Does it Matter, 9 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 397 (2006). By invoking certain
assumed collections of “the people,” SANE and CSP engage in an identity and group
construction exercise. See CARLES BOIX & SUSAN C. STOKES, OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPAR.
POLS. (2009). They define themselves in opposition to the “other,” and, in doing so,
circumscribe a certain acceptable type of action. Id. Identity-formation and politics matter
because the “us versus them” paradigm motivates bias, prejudice, and violence. Id.
214 CSP 2010, supra note 160, at 119.
215 Id.
208
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infiltration of foreign laws and the incompetence of government elites,
CSP warns that the Constitution is under threat.216 Thus, the people must
take back some of their sovereignty to protect against the dangerous
invasion of Islam.217
In a 2012 report assessing the presence of sharia law in
American state courts, CSP alleged to have identified fifty significant
state court cases, including fifteen trial court cases and twelve appellate
court cases, where the presiding judge found that an analysis of sharia
was applicable.218 For CSP, these cases are evidence of sharia’s cooptation of American institutions, as well as the success of “stealth” or
“civilization” jihad.219 Based on Muslim Brotherhood documents
uncovered in the United States v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and
Development trial, civilization jihad occurs prior to violent jihad but is,
nevertheless, oriented towards transforming society and overthrowing
Western democracy.220 In a 2016 report, CSP describes civilization
jihad as “the enemy among us, working out in the open but disguised by
deceit” and says it “poses the greater long-term threat to our legal
system and way of life.”221
Faced with the threat of Islam manifested in sharia law and
civilization jihad, CSP believes that the people must resist “elites” who
have capitulated and enabled sharia’s spread. This notion resonates with
popular constitutionalism’s goal of wrestling constitutional interpretive
powers away from judges.222 For CSP and ACT, judges are viewed with
216 Id. (“As a nation, we have lost our understanding of America’s founding principles and, as
a result, have become increasingly ill-prepared to defend the superiority of those principles.”).
217 Id. at 130-31.
218 Shariah Law and American State Courts: An Assessment of State Appellate Court Cases,
CTR.
FOR
SEC.
POL’Y
(Aug.
30,
2012),
https://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/2012/08/30/shariah-law-and-american-state-courts/.
219 See CSP 2016, supra note 212, at 12-14.
220 CSP 2010, supra note 160, at 17; CSP 2016 supra note 212, at 14; What Is Civilization
Jihad, COUNTER JIHAD, https://counterjihad.com/backgrounder/what-is-civilization-jihad/ (last
visited Oct. 23, 2021). See also United States v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., No. 3:04cr-0240-P, 2008 WL 11355290 (N.D. Tex. July 3, 2008).The concept of “civilization jihad”
comes from a memo entitled “Explanatory Memorandum on the General Strategic Goal for the
Group in North America,” discovered during an FBI raid of the home of a Muslim Brotherhood
member named Mohamed Akram Adlouni. Bridge Initiative Team, “Civilization Jihad:”
Debunking The Conspiracy Theory, GEO. BRIDGE INITIATIVE (Feb. 2, 2016),
https://bridge.georgetown.edu/research/civilization-jihad-debunking-the-conspiracy-theory/.
The memo states that Akram believes that the Muslim Brotherhood “eliminat[e] and destro[y]
Western civilization from within . . . .” Id. Although, there is no evidence that this letter was
approved or even acknowledged by the Muslim Brotherhood as a whole, the memo continues
to be used as evidence of the overarching mission of both the Muslim Brotherhood and Islam
overall. Id.
221 CSP 2016, supra note 212, at 15.
222 Id. at 26.
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particular suspicion for failing to uphold their constitutional duty to
reject foreign law.223
iii.

Reflective Laws and Rhetoric

APPA, ACT, and CSP’s popular constitutionalist arguments are
reflected in the dozens of laws introduced nationwide. Even before
SQ755, popular constitutionalist language regarding the threat of sharia
law had already permeated the legislative forum.224 In 2008, Colorado
Republican Representative Thomas Tancredo introduced HR6975
entitled the “Jihad Prevention Act.”225 If passed, the Act would have
amended the Immigration and Nationalization Act to require noncitizens to pledge that they would not implement sharia in the United
States.226 The Act invokes both the “foreignness” of sharia and its
inherent incompatibility with United States values, since the
punishment for violation is the revocation of any visa or citizenship.227
SQ755 continued to perpetuate the myth that an inherent
incompatibility exists between Islam and America. Although sharia law
had never been cited in Oklahoma courts, state lawmakers justified the
necessity of SQ755 as a “pre-emptive strike” against Islamic law.228
They also emphasized the invasive nature of sharia, with state
representative Lewis Moore saying, “‘Are we not at war with this
ideology?’ and state senator Anthony Sykes saying, ‘Sharia law coming
to the US is a scary concept . . . [h]opefully the passage of this
constitutional amendment will prevent it in Oklahoma.’”229 Beyond the

223 CSP 2014, supra note 169, at 16. This CSP report finds that 1 in 5 American judges have
failed to reject foreign law that violates United States and state public policy. Id. See also CSP
2010, supra note 160, at 11 (“Our national leaders and military and intelligence officers took
oaths to ‘support and defend’ the Constitution that is now being targeted by those foreign and
domestic enemies who seek our submission to shariah.”).
224 See Yaser Ali, Shariah and Citizenship—How Islamophobia Is Creating a Second-Class
Citizenry in America, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1027, 1042-43 (2012).
225 Jihad Prevention Act, H.R. 6975, 110th Cong. (2008).
226
Id. at § 2 (“Any alien who fails to attest, in accordance with procedures specified by the
Secretary of Homeland Security, that the alien will not advocate installing a Sharia law system
in the United States is inadmissible.”).
227 Id. at §§ 3-4 (stating that “the visa of any alien advocating the installation of a Sharia law
system in the United States shall be revoked,” and “[a]dvocating the installation of a Sharia law
system in the United States shall constitute a ground for revocation of a person’s naturalization
under this subsection.”).
228 Davis & Kalb, supra note 121, at 7; Ali, supra note 224, at 1029; Mark Schlachtenhaufen,
Sharia Law, Courts Likely on 2010 Ballot, THE EDMOND SUN (Jun. 4, 2010),
https://www.normantranscript.com/edmond/sharia-law-courts-likely-on-2010ballot/article_769e3baf-5fb8-5b9c-9dff-5bea567c5007.html.
229 Ali, supra note 224, at 1029-30; Schlachtenhaufen, supra note 228.
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clear fearmongering, these laws demonstrate deep distrust of the United
States’ judicial system.230
The first major initiative after SQ755, a 2011 Tennessee antiterrorism law, would have empowered the state attorney general to
designate Islamic groups as “sharia organizations.”231 In its original
iteration, this law provided that “knowing adherence to sharia and to
foreign sharia authorities is prima facie evidence of an act in support of
the overthrow of the United States.”232 The bill defined sharia as an
inherently violent “legal-political-military doctrinal system,” which
requires anyone who adheres to it to seek the violent overthrow of the
U.S. government.233 Sharia and violent jihad are conflated, as, according
to the bill, “the unchanging and ultimate aim of jihad is the imposition
of sharia.”234 Supporters praised the bill as emblematic of Tennessee’s
leading role in preventing civilization jihad in the American legal
system.235
In addition, while facially neutral laws do not include ACT or
CSP’s talking points within the four corners of the text, the rhetoric and
context around these bills demonstrate that they are oriented towards
similar ends.236 A Kansas bill, for example, did not explicitly mention
sharia.237 However, the sponsoring representative, Peggy Mast,
referenced the CSP Report on the use of sharia law in state courts to
justify the bill, stating “we need to assert our Constitution is still the law
of the land.”238 Similarly, in Missouri, the anti-sharia law amendment’s
sponsor analogized the threat of sharia to the polio virus that could
quickly spread and infect the entirety of the state’s judicial system.239
Thus, it is clear that anti-sharia activism has taken on a popular
constitutionalist form, actively working to elevate the constitutional
interpretation of a specific sub-section of the people over institutional
judicial analysis.

230
231
232
233
234
235
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237
238
239

Davis & Kalb, supra note 121, at 7.
S.B. 1028, 107th Leg. Sess. (Tenn. 2011); Elliott, supra note 173.
S.B. 1028, supra note 231. See also ABA House of Delegates, supra note 149.
Bambach, supra note 134, at 84-85; S.B. 1028, supra note 231.
Bambach, supra note 134, at 80; SB1028, supra note 231.
PATEL ET AL., supra note 186, at 34.
Bambach, supra note 134 at 81-82.
H.B. 2087, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2011).
Yazdiha, supra note 117, at 267-68.
Ali, supra note 224, at 1065.
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THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OPPORTUNITY

When the “popular” turns out to be regressive groups intent on
redefining foundational principles like religion and secular in pursuit of
entrenched illiberal goals, a counter-balancing mechanism within the
constitutional structure is necessary. Issues of secularism, religious
liberty, and even more essentially, of belonging are litigated in the
courts.240 Yet how these conflicts shake out largely depends on social
forces, which guide the court’s ability to gauge religious convictions
and their place in wider socio-political debates.241 Section III.A
demonstrates the limitations of using the First Amendment to challenge
anti-sharia laws.242 Section III.B argues that, to both repeal anti-sharia
laws in the short-term and unsettle the illiberal biases on which they are
based in the long-term, civil rights activists should consider bringing
suit under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.243
This Section asserts that civil rights activists should follow the lead of
gender-discrimination cases and argue that anti-sharia laws are
unconstitutional because they reflect and perpetuate harmful
stereotypes.
A. The Limitations of the First Amendment
Civil rights activists have used the First Amendment to strike
down anti-sharia laws. For example, Muneer Awad successfully
demonstrated how SQ755 could not satisfy a strict scrutiny analysis and
thus impermissibly infringed on his Free Exercise and Establishment
Clause rights.244 Courts have more generally shown a willingness to
strike down facially neutral laws that discriminate against religion.
In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, despite the fact that the
contraceptive mandate in question was facially neutral, the Supreme
Court still evaluated whether it substantially burdened religion under the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA).245 The Court did
240
See BARBARA WELKE, LAW AND THE BORDERS OF BELONGING IN THE LONG NINETEENTH
CENTURY UNITED STATES (2010).
241 Tebbe, supra note 81, at 977 (referencing Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church &
Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171 (2012), in which “traditional” believers found comfort that they
will continue to be protected, even when they engage in illiberal behavior).
242 See infra Section III.A.
243 See infra Section III.B.
244 Awad v. Ziriax, 966 F. Supp. 2d 1198, (W.D. Okla. 2013).
245 573 U.S. 682, 726-27 (2014). RFRA prohibits the government from burdening the exercise
of religion, even when it results from neutral laws, unless the law: “‘(1) is in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest.’ 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb–1.” Id. at 726.
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not defer to the government’s justification that the mandate served the
public interests of health and gender equality, but rather examined the
marginal interests of the parties.246 Even though the government’s
interest was to protect another constitutional right, namely the right to
obtain contraception, the Court found that the mandate was neither
narrowly tailored enough nor the least restrictive means.247 Thus, the
harm to religion could not stand.248
It is unclear if this type of protection extends to situations when
a facially neutral law primarily impacts Islam. For example, in Trump
v. Hawaii, the petitioners argued that the executive proclamation
banning immigration from Muslim-majority countries violated the First
Amendment by disproportionately burdening Muslims.249 Although the
proclamation was facially neutral, petitioners pointed to language used
by President Trump and others as evidence of its biased objective to ban
Muslims.250 Yet, when evaluating the law, the Court accepted its facial
neutrality and was persuaded by the government’s national security
justification.251
Therefore, while First Amendment arguments can be successful,
their potency is limited by the anti-sharia law movement’s successful
popular constitutionalist reframing of Islam as non-religious. By
defining sharia as a totalitarian, foreign, and military force, the antisharia law movement effectively demonstrates that only those religions
perceived to be in-line with modern Western society count as valid
religion, and enjoy all the relevant protections.252 Islam, intent on
destroying the liberal order, cannot count.253 Litigating under the First
Amendment alone cannot disturb the root prejudices used by anti-sharia
law activists to reinforce the necessity of the bills.

246

Id. at 726-27. See also Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546
U.S. 418, 430-31 (2006).
247 Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 726-29.
248 Id. at 735-36. But see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-486 (1965) (the ruling
in Hobby Lobby occurred despite that the fact that, in Griswold, the Court reaffirmed the
privacy interest of married couples to buy and use contraception without being subject to
government regulation.).
249 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2417 (2018).
250 Id. at 2417-18.
251 Id. at 2418.
252 COVIELLO, supra note 82, at 28.
253 Beydoun, supra note 114, at 1751.
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B. The Fourteenth Amendment – The Equal Protection
Clause and Stereotyping
In Federalist Paper No. 51, James Madison elucidates how the
Framers purposely designed constitutional protections to protect
minorities against tyranny of the majority.254 As Justice Harlan
exclaimed in his dissent in the anti-canonical case Plessy v. Ferguson,
“Our constitution . . . neither knows nor tolerates classes among
citizens . . . The law regards man as man, and takes no account of his
surroundings or his color when his civil rights as guaranteed by the
supreme law of the land are involved.”255 In other words, the
Constitution treats all citizens equally and with neutrality.256
In this vein, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause covers all groups, regardless of their societal favorability. Justice
Brennan, in U.S. Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, underscored that
at its most basic, the Equal Protection Clause prevents a “bare
congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group” from
constituting “a legitimate government interest.”257 Additionally, under
Fourteenth Amendment analysis, religious minorities enjoy a higher
level of scrutiny because they are distinct and insular minorities.258
Civil rights activists have an opportunity to frame their claims
in Equal Protection Clause language.259 Unlike under the First
Amendment, under the Fourteenth Amendment, civil rights activists
could challenge laws based on how they perpetuate impermissible
stereotypes, under the larger animus framework.260 Litigation of this
type not only could successfully strike down anti-sharia laws, but it
could also redefine the societal baseline about Islam, forcing a reexamination of normative assumptions about what constitutes permitted
religious practice.

254

THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison). See also Ali, supra note 224, at 1061.
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
256 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996).
257 U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
258 United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
259 U.S. CONST . amend. XIV (“No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
260 William D. Araiza, Animus and Its Discontents, 71 FLA. L. REV. 155, 182 (2019).
255
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Impermissible Stereotypes

The treatment of Islam in the courts is based on stereotypes
perpetuated and strengthened by ACT, CSP, and APPA, amongst
others. These social movements purposely frame Islam as a political and
military doctrine, not as a system of faith or belief.261 In doing so, they
further entrench the historic otherization and demonization of Islam in
America.
a. Sex and Gender Discrimination Cases
In sex and gender discrimination cases, courts have deemed
legislation that reflects and perpetuates biased stereotypes
unconstitutional.262 To justify a policy that discriminates on the basis of
sex, the government must not only show that the policy is substantially
related to a governmental interest, but also that it does not reflect
stereotypes.263 These stereotypes do not have to be overt or blatantly
biased, nor must they be irrational or uncritical.264 In fact, impermissible
stereotypes can actually be based on some level of empirical support
and, as such, appear rational.265 For example, in Weinberger v.
Weisenfeld, the Court examined whether the Social Security Act, in its
treatment of husbands, but not wives, as primary earners, was
discriminatory.266 Although admitting that empirical evidence existed
supporting the contention that men were more likely to be the primary
earners, the Court still found that the gender-based generalizations did
not justify the negative effects of the policy.267
Furthermore, courts have already demonstrated the ability to
discern when a stereotype is being used to justify an illiberal policy,
even if that stereotype contains a “shred of truth” or “some statistical

261

See supra Section II.B.
See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 515-16 (1996); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.,
511 U.S. 127, 140 (1994); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 645 (1975).
263 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 515-16 (“Parties who seek to defend gender-based
government action must demonstrate an ‘exceedingly persuasive justification’ for that
action . . . . [C]ategorization by sex may not be used to create or perpetuate the legal, social, and
economic inferiority of women.”).
264 Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53, 89 (2001) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
265
Id. at 89-90.
266 Weinberger, 420 U.S. at 645.
267 Id. (stating that these negative effects were “the denigration of the efforts of women who do
work and whose earnings contribute significantly to their families’ support”).
262
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support can be conjured up for the generalization.”268 Therefore, when
evaluating a claim of discrimination under Equal Protection Clause
analysis, courts are able to determine whether or not the policy is likely
“to stigmatize as well as to perpetuate historical patterns of
discrimination.”269
For example, in J.E.B. v. Alabama, the state of Alabama, on
behalf of the mother, sought child support from a putative father.270
During jury selection, Alabama used nearly all of its preemptory strikes
to remove men from the jury pool, leading to an all-female jury.271 The
state justified its decision to strike the majority of the male jurors by
arguing that, keeping all other qualifications equal, female jurors were
more likely be more sympathetic and receptive to their case.272 The
Court disagreed, and found that Alabama’s actions “ratif[ied] and
reinforc[ed] prejudicial views of the relative abilities of men and
women.”273 The Court went on to describe these prejudicial views as
“invidious, overbroad, and archaic stereotypes.”274
Finally, the Court “has consistently found government
enforcement of private prejudice impermissible, even when the
justifications are legitimate or even compelling.”275 In Palmore v.
Sidoti, a state court judge awarded sole custody of a three-year-old
daughter to her father after he complained that her mother was in an
interracial relationship.276 In its unanimous holding, the Supreme Court
reasoned that the state judge’s order was unconstitutional not because it
failed a strict scrutiny analysis, but rather because it gave force to private
racial biases.277 Reaching this conclusion, the Court did not concern
268 J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 140, n.11 (1994) (“The Equal Protection
Clause, as interpreted by decisions of this Court, acknowledges that a shred of truth may be
contained in some stereotypes, but requires that state actors look beyond the surface before
making judgments about people that are likely to stigmatize as well as to perpetuate historical
patterns of discrimination.”). See also, e.g., Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 89; Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718,
725 (1982); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 201 (1976); Weinberger 420 U.S. at 645; Stanton v.
Stanton 421 U.S. 7, 14 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973).
269 J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 140.
270 Id. at 129.
271 Id.
272 Id. at 137-38.
273 Id. at 130-31.
274 Id. at 131.
275 Eric Merriam, Fire, Aim, Ready – Militarizing Animus: Unit Cohesion and the Transgender
Ban, 123 DICK. L. REV. 57, 66 (2018).
276 Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 431 (1984). The state court’s reasoning rested on the child
being susceptible to peer pressures and social stigmatization from living in an interracial
household with unmarried adults. Id.
277 Id. at 432-34; Merriam, supra note 275, at 65-66.
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itself with an examination of the reasonability of the private racial
bias.278 The potential harm of a public enforcement of a private bias,
and thus the state-sanctioning of personal animus, was itself
constitutionally impermissible.279 Thus, a finding of animus-motivation
circumvents the regular Equal Protection Clause tiered analysis,
pushing the onus on the government to defend against claims of
invidiousness and justify its actions.280
b. Potential Use by Civil Rights Activists
Civil rights activists should borrow from this language about
stereotyping and animus with the goal of forcing courts to articulate
what biased stereotypes about Islam entail and the damage that they do,
just as courts have done for gender-based stereotypes.281 Forcing a court
to reference the invidious biases and stereotypes promoted by antisharia laws would be a powerful way to contend with the reframing of
Islam as non-religious.
Anti-sharia law promoters have worked hard to mainstream their
belief that Islam, positioned as an invading foreign threat, undermines
essential liberties in order to destroy American civilization.282 Public
opinion polling demonstrates that, while opinions about Muslims are
becoming more positive, the religion still receives the lowest approval
rankings.283 A 2016 Pew Research Poll found that nearly half of
American adults think some Muslims are anti-American.284 Building on
278

Merriam, supra note 275, at 66.
Id.
280 Araiza, supra note 260, at 186-87.
281 Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 442 (1998) (quoting Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199,
223 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring)) (“Discrimination that ‘is merely the accidental byproduct
of a traditional way of thinking about females’ is unacceptable.”).
282 See supra Section II.C.
283 How the U.S. General Public Views Muslims and Islam, PEW RSCH. CTR. (July 26, 2017),
https://www.pewforum.org/2017/07/26/how-the-u-s-general-public-views-muslims-andislam/. Pew Research Center asked respondents to rate Muslims on a “feeling thermometer”
ranging from 0 to 100, where 0 degrees indicates the coldest, most negative feelings, and 100
degrees indicates the warmest, most positive feelings. On average, Americans gave Muslims a
thermometer rating of 48 degrees, which was 8 degrees warmer than in 2014, when the Center
first posed the question. However, this is lower than all the other categories. Atheists received
a 50; Mormons received a 54; Hindus received a 58; Buddhists received a 60; Evangelical
Christians received a 61; Mainline Protestants received a 65; Catholics received a 66, and Jews
received a 67. Id
284 Republicans Prefer Blunt Talk About Islamic Extremism, Democrats Favor Caution, PEW
RSCH. CTR. (Feb. 3, 2016), https://www.pewforum.org/2016/02/03/republicans-prefer-blunttalk-about-islamic-extremism-democrats-favor-caution/. One-quarter of U.S. adults (25%)
think half or more of Muslims in the U.S. are “anti-American,” while an additional 24% of
adults think “some” Muslims are anti-American. Id.
279
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this, a 2017 Pew Research Poll found that fourty-four percent of
American adults believed there was a natural conflict between Islam and
democracy.285 The pervasive anti-Muslim bias in the mainstream body
politic cannot be attributed to the activity of ACT, CSP, ALAC, and
SANE alone. Yet these social movements intend for their campaigns to
imbue society with their particular perspective on totalitarian and
threatening Islam. Thus, it is highly likely that the work of Yerushalmi,
ACT, CSP, and others has impacted how Americans continue to
perceive Islam.
Anti-Muslim bias is also a historic part of American politics and
identity, bolstering its appearance as rational.286 Yet perceived
rationality does not insulate a law that makes classifications from a
judicial determination that it promotes impermissible stereotypes. Faced
with a Fourteenth Amendment lawsuit, CSP and ACT would likely
emphasize how anti-sharia laws are necessary to combat the
documented infiltration of the judicial system by sharia. Relying on S.D.
v. M.J.R., as well as CSP’s 2012 Report on the fifty significant state
court cases in which sharia was used, these social movements would
argue that anti-sharia laws are justified by empirical realities.287
However, a court could still find that the law is based on a stereotype,
despite this evidence.
One of the most dangerous consequences of stereotypes is that
they make assumptions about an individual based on their membership
to a particular group.288 For example, laws based on gender and sex
stereotypes “restrict individual choices by punishing those men and
women who do not fit the stereotype mold.”289 Stereotypes about Islam
similarly exclude individuality. For example, the 2010 CSP report
flattens perceptions of Islam, saying that the mainstream practice of

285 How the U.S. General Public Views Muslims and Islam, supra note 283. When asked to
describe, in their own words, the reasons why they think there is a natural conflict between Islam
and democracy, many Americans (44% of those who see such a conflict) say there is a basic
incompatibility or tension between the tenets of Islam and the principles of democracy. One
respondent, for example, said, “There is no democracy in Islam.” Id.
286 See supra Section I.D.
287 Shariah Law and American State Courts, supra note 218. Additionally, the Court has shown
itself willing to investigate statistics presented in support of a discriminatory law. For example,
in Craig v. Boren, the Court found that “the very social stereotypes that find reflection in agedifferential laws . . . are likely substantially to distort the accuracy of these comparative
statistics.” 429 U.S. 190, 202 n.14 (1976).
288 J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994); Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 469
(1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
289 Isaacs v. Felder Servs., LLC, 143 F.Supp.3d 1190, 1194 (M.D. Ala. 2015).
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sharia is the greatest threat to the United States.290 By purposely
stripping Islam of its religious components, the anti-sharia movement
de-emphasizes and obscures how sharia law interacts with personal and
individual preferences, fulfilling the criteria of a stereotype.291
In his suit challenging SQ755, Muneer Awad invoked his First
Amendment freedoms.292 Although SQ755 included an explicit
classification, Awad did not make a Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection Clause claim.293 When faced with anti-sharia laws that, like
SQ755, explicitly mention sharia or Islam, civil rights activists should
bring suit under the Fourteenth Amendment using the proposed
stereotype framework. These suits would force courts to contend with,
and hopefully dismiss the viability of, arguments based on the
underlying biases perpetuated by anti-sharia laws and linked to historic,
prejudiced understandings of Americanism and Islam. Forcing states to
find an exceedingly persuasive justification for anti-sharia laws without
depending on stereotypes would lay bare the biased nature of these laws.
This path is most immediately applicable to laws like SQ755 that
explicitly mention anti-sharia or Islam. Once courts identify the baseline
components of impermissible stereotypes about Islam and Muslims, this
criterion could be used to challenge the more nefarious facially neutral
bills.
Certainly, even if civil rights advocates utilize this strategy, they
will be advocating to a bench with a very pro-Christian religious
doctrinal approach.294 In a major departure from its predecessors, the
Roberts Court has ruled in favor of religious organizations over 81% of
the time, with mainstream Christian organizations as the most common
victors.295 Of the three cases involving non-mainstream Christian
plaintiffs, the only loss occurred in Trump v. Hawaii.296 The Court’s
movement perhaps reflects the sticky narrative of Christian values as
under threat from secularists, atheists, and the LGBTQIA+
290

CSP 2010, supra note 160, at 123. These reports do not, for example, discuss the differences
between Shi’a and Sunni Islam, or the different types of practice within these two major
categories. Id.
291 See Pedrioli, supra note 10, at 66; ABA House of Delegates, supra note 149, at 1-3; PATEL
ET AL., supra note 186, at 1-5.
292 See supra Section II.A.
293 Robert E. Michael, The Anti-Shari’a Movement – Unconstitutional Dimension or Homeland
Security?, 18 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 347, 352-53 (2012).
294 See Epstein & Posner, supra note 80, at 1, 8, 18-19.
295 Id. at 1.
296 Id. at 8. Epstein & Posner comment that, when viewed through the lens of the Roberts Court
as pro-mainstream Christianity, “Trump v. Hawaii is no longer an anomaly but fits the pattern:
the outcome is not pro-religion (it harms Muslims) but it advances, or at least is consistent with,
a pro-Christian agenda.” Id.
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community,297 which justified the Roberts Court’s extension of
“protections for minority religions so as to encompass majority religions
as well.”298
Even so, employing a Fourteenth Amendment animus and
stereotyping strategy is the first step in a long road to undo the
dangerous public perception of Islam as a violent and foreign political
threat. The law, along with civil rights and liberties movements, must
play a role in helping society unlearn entrenched and hidden biases. So
far, anti-Muslim social movements have most successfully used popular
constitutionalism to define religion. However, courts can rebut these
narratives by articulating the stereotypes of Islam and acknowledging
the inherent limitations of religion and secularism as currently
understood.
CONCLUSION
“Christian faith is not the past but the present and the future.
Make it stronger.”299
Anti-sharia laws carry real life-and-death dangers beyond their
text. They reflect and perpetuate the continued marginalization of the
American-Muslim community.300 The educational aspect of these
initiatives, identified as the primary priority by David Yerushalmi,
legitimize bias and prejudice that, in particularly potent doses, motivate
acts of violence.301 According to the latest FBI Hate Crime Statistics
Report, in 2020, of the 1,244 victims of anti-religious hate crimes, 8.8%
were victims of anti-Muslim bias.302 Even in supposedly liberal and
progressive bastions, anti-Muslim hate crimes continue at unacceptably

297 For examples of this narrative, see Federalist Society, Address by Justice Samuel Alito,
YOUTUBE (Nov. 12, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VMnukCVIZWQ, and William
P. Barr, Attorney General, Dep’t of Just., Attorney General William P. Barr Delivers Remarks
to the Law School and the de Nicola Center for Ethics and Culture at the University of Notre
Dame (Oct. 11, 2019) (transcript available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorneygeneral-william-p-barr-delivers-remarks-law-school-and-de-nicola-center-ethics).
298 See Epstein & Posner, supra note 80, at 8.
299 Presidential Candidate Donald Trump Remarks in Detroit, C-SPAN (Sept. 3, 2016),
https://www.c-span.org/video/?414743-1/donald-trump-speaks-african-american-churchdetroit.
300 See Bambach, supra note 134, at 72-73.
301 Elliott, supra note 173.
302 2020 Hate Crimes Statistics, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Dec. 9, 2021),
https://www.justice.gov/crs/highlights/2020-hate-crimes-statistics.
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high levels.303 Additionally, these statistics do not capture the quotidian
threat under which most American Muslims live.304 Therefore, antisharia laws, especially in their support of a certain type of civic
nationalist and American identity, have consequences for the real lives
and bodies of thousands of Americans.
Anti-sharia law advocates, using popular constitutionalist
tactics, purport to speak for the people. They take advantage of the
squishiness and fluidity of the borders of religion and secularism. In
doing so, they further legitimize the historic prejudice that Islam and
America are inherently incompatible, and justify further action, like
anti-mosque demonstrations, large-scale surveillance, and physical
violence.305 Employing a Fourteenth Amendment perspective within the
contours of the secular nation would expose and debunk anti-Muslim
prejudices. Therefore, this tactic could dismantle pervasive, historic,
stereotypes used to justify anti-sharia laws and other forms of social,
political, and physical violence. The law is elastic, and understandings
of belonging are iterative. Fourteenth Amendment challenges to antisharia laws could promote inclusiveness and, in doing so, bring society
closer to the equal and tolerant America the Constitution imagines.

Press Release, CAIR-NY Reports 74% Increase in Anti-Muslim Hate Crimes Since Trump’s
Election, CAIR (March 5, 2018), https://www.cair-ny.org/news/2018/3/5/cair-ny-reports-74increase-in-anti-muslim-hate-crimes-since-trumps-election.
304 Katayoun Kishi, Anti-Muslim Assaults Reach 9/11-Era Levels, FBI Data Show, P EW
RSCH. CTR. (Nov. 21, 2016), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/11/21/anti-muslimassaults-reach-911-era-levels-fbi-data-show/.
305 See Craig Considine, The Racialization of Islam in the United States: Islamophobia, Hate
Crimes, and “Flying while Brown”, RELIGIONS, Sept. 2017, at 1, 10 (finding that the
association of Islam with terror and violence contributes to conveying the “message that
American Muslims are a threat to national security and require careful monitoring and
surveillance”). See also Ahmed Shaheed (Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or
Belief), Countering Islamophobia/Anti-Muslim Hatred to Eliminate Discrimination and
Intolerance Based on Religion or Belief, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/46/30 (Apr. 13, 2021)
(“Islamophobic attitudes that draw on negative overgeneralizations about Islam and
essentializations of Muslims –– which depict them as threatening and centre on constructions
of irreconcilable cultural differences between Muslims and the values of majority populations
–– have fuelled acts of discrimination, hostility and violence against Muslim individuals and
communities.”).
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